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THESIS ABSTRACT
Joel Max Southall
Master of Arts
Department of Philosophy
June 2015
Title: Situating Vine Deloria, Jr.'s Philosophy of Science
This thesis provides a view of Deloria's thoughts on science and metaphysics, 
presenting his criticism of Western science and of his proposed alternative to what he 
presents as a historically evidenced epistemic attitude of exclusion. Deloria refers to 
Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, suggesting that the institution of Western science 
operates according to a paradigm that is both very different from that of traditional 
Indigenous knowledge practice and fundamentally exclusionary. A potential of 
communication between Western science and Indigenous knowledge is possible through 
paradigm shifts as well as through reference to epistemic anarchy. My presentation of 
Deloria's description of Indigenous metaphysics includes an account of an agential 
ontology and place-grounded epistemology with reference to Daniel R. Wildcat, Baruch 
Spinoza, Scott L. Pratt, and others. Ultimately, Deloria breaks with Feyerabend's 
epistemological anarchy in light of our contemporary environmental predicament and 
advocates a more restrained, relational epistemology.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Why Deloria?
There are two ways of relating to knowledge and existence: antagonism and 
harmony. Western civilization has long operated according to the former and neglected 
the latter, going so far at times as to claim sole access to the possibility of absolute 
knowledge.  Fundamental alienation and a pernicious attitude toward the surrounding 
world informed Western culture's progression from antiquity to the birth of science, 
capitalism, the subjugation of the rest of the world and our contemporary environmental 
disaster. 
In light of post-Kuhnian criticisms of science, many philosophers of science have 
begun to realize the limits of universal concepts and unbridled exercise of power.  And 
there are some in these ranks skeptical toward old epistemic attitudes of certainty and 
exclusion who do not advocate a wholesale rejection of science, but rather advocate for a 
reform and strengthening. Vine Deloria Jr., I suggest, despite his at times polemic 
approach, is such a voice. It the intent of this thesis, then, to present Deloria's critique of 
Western science and examine the alternatives he presents to this epistemic attitude of 
exclusion.
Following this, the central question is what Deloria's recommendation for an 
amended scientific practice might be, given that Deloria criticizes what he sees as 
Western science's problematic epistemic attitude. Although he allies himself with Paul 
Feyerabend, I argue that he has his own vision of what science should be – one founded 
on an Indigenous view of spatiality and the ethical importance of relationality.
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It is only through this fundamental reformation of our contemporary metaphysical
understanding that, in Deloria's view, we can effectively deal with our emerging, arguably
pre-apocalyptic, planetary situation in the face of an increasingly interconnected world 
and the quickening pace of technology that render older Western patterns of interpreting 
data obsolete.
This project of reformation is informed by and vitally important to what we might
identify as Deloria's Indigenous epistemology and his critique of what he often refers to 
as Western science.
Daniel Wildcat, Professor at Haskell Indian Nations University,  characterizes this
project as one of “indigenizing the future.” Indigenizing, as Wildcat describes it, is “a set 
of practices that results in processes in which people seriously reexamine and adopt those
particular and unique cultures that emerged from the places they choose to live today” 
(Wildcat, 2005, 419). In line with this, Deloria believes that indigenous epistemology and
way of life represent a more embodied, adapted existence in our contemporary world. 
Ultimately, Deloria argues for a knowledge-practice grounded in place and 
informed by an extensive account of agency beyond human persons. 
With these points in mind, the intent of this paper is to present Deloria's criticisms
of Western science and to ultimately reach a conclusion on the viability of Deloria's 
proposal for a reformed science.
Towards these ends, I will consider Deloria's conception of “science” and its 
critique in his major works including: God is Red: A Native View of Religion (1994), The 
Metaphysics of Modern Existence (1979), Red Earth, White Lies: Native Americans and 
the Myth of Scientific Fact (1995), Spirit and Reason: The Vine Deloria, Jr., Reader 
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(1999), Evolution, and Creationism, and Other Modern Myths (2002), and the jointly 
authored work with Daniel Wildcat, Power and Place (2001). In addition to these larger 
works, I will also be drawing from Deloria's article, “Civilization and Isolation,” to create
a larger, more accurate picture of his views on distinctly maladaptive Western ways of 
thinking.
Beyond Deloria's works, I will also use various works from Daniel Wildcat, Scott 
L. Pratt,  Paul Feyerabend, along with several others to clarify and explain Deloria's 
views.
Finally, it would seem important to note that my intention is not to address the 
veracity of Deloria's particular and often seemingly fantastical claims, such as those 
found in his discussion of evolution's lack of true empirical credibility, Velakovsky's 
version of catastrophism, the sighting of dinosaurs by particular tribes within the past few
hundred years, and others. Rather, my intention is to identify his epistemological stance 
and vision of fostering a localized indigenous epistemology. 
Taking Non-Western Criticisms Seriously
Before we begin on this project, it would seem prudent to discuss the importance 
of taking criticisms of Western science from a non-Western perspective seriously.
To start with, it is important to note that Deloria's discussion of Western science at
times appears as a caricature of what scientific practice actually is about and how it 
works.  At times, Deloria seems to treat science in two different, perhaps contradictory 
ways.  In some places he makes a case for compatibility between Western science, thus 
indicating that science has value, and that Indigenous knowledge-practice understood via 
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the field of ethnoscience is compatible with it. At other places, he seems to target science 
for what he suggests is a tendency toward authoritarianism, exclusion, ossification and 
excessive abstraction, even to the point of making a caricature of science. In this case 
indigenous knowledge practice is offered as a better alternative.
Of course, it seems clear that most scientists, while they may be interested in 
making universal claims in the context of their work, recognize that universal claims are 
fallible. Science, according to Karl Popper, is a search for truth, but “is not the search for 
certainty . . . [as] . . . all human knowledge is fallible as therefore uncertain” (Popper, 
2000, 4). This corroborates Dewey's definition of scientific practice as relishing doubt 
even while exemplifying a logic that seeks clarification of natural laws and epistemic 
expectation. As Matthew J. Brown states, concerning Dewey's view on the scientific 
spirit of inquiry, “the scientific attitude may almost be defined as that which is capable of 
enjoying the doubtful; scientific method is, in one aspect, a technique for making 
productive use of doubt by converting it into operations of definite inquiry” (Brown 279).
In this sense, science doesn't look for certainty, but rather, it looks for conditions of 
uncertainty so as to solve problems, thus ostensibly precluding ossification and dogma.
Reflecting on Dewey and Popper's definition of science as something other than a 
simple quest for certainty, one might suggest that Deloria overstates his case against 
Western science. With this criticism of Deloria in mind, then, we might wonder as to the 
use of reading Deloria. If he fallaciously presents such an inaccurate caricature of actual 
scientific practice, why isn't he suited for the dustbin of eccentric, mistaken ideas? 
In response to this, we might draw attention to the marginalization of non-Western
viewpoints, as discussed extensively by decolonial thinkers and feminist thinkers, cited 
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by Sandra Harding in her work, Sciences From Below, who also cite a historic 
marginalization of women in Western knowledge-practice. With this historical 
marginalization in mind, it seems perverse to dismiss outright a member of a historically 
oppressed non-Western community, rather than exploring potentially valuable insights 
their standpoint may provide.
This point is argued by feminist standpoint theorists such as Sandra Harding, 
Donna Haraway, Nancy Hartsock, Dorthy Smith and others. Their specific claim that I 
refer to here is that certain socio-political positions occupied by oppressed groups might 
afford perspectives that are epistemically advantaged and could serve as important and 
useful starting points for inquiry. As Sandra Harding states, “starting off research from 
the lives of people in groups that are absent from the design and management of the 
institutions which administer everyone's lives has both scientific/epistemic and political 
consequences” (Harding, 2008, 121-122). These consequences, she argues, allow for less 
distorted accounts of the actual contents of experience for both the oppressed groups and 
the groups that oppress.
Delorian Scholarship
Beyond analyzing the necessity of a non-Western criticisms, it would be wise to 
note some of the existing academic discourse, though scant, surrounding Deloria's views 
on science.1
1  There is small but diverse secondary literature on the work of Deloria.  The literature I will engage in 
this thesis is focused on Deloria and science.  Other literature includes in anthology, theology, and 
American Indian law.
Though I encountered some discussion of Deloria's relation to anthropology in the works I used, I 
chose not to highlight this discussion.  Accordingly, there are various articles and books written from that 
field that engage with Deloria or mention him briefly.  Some of these are as follows: 
Raymond J. DeMallie's 2006 American Anthropologist article, “Vine Deloria Jr. (1933-2005)”; 
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One review that stands out as a good example of what Deloria criticizes is H. 
David Brumble's American Literary History review, “Vine Deloria, Jr., Creationism, and 
Ethnic Psuedoscience,” wherein he makes the point that not only is Deloria ungenerous 
with science, but that he is fundamentally anti-realist and practices a sort of “affirmative 
action science” akin to that of “melanin scholars” and creationists. Melanin scholars, as 
Brumble describes them, are Afrocentric thinkers who seek to “provide pseudoscientific 
underpinnings for an Afrocentric creation myth” via the claim that melanin “has 
remarkable powers” such that African Americans are more physically and intellectually 
capable than other groups (Brumble, 1998, 338).
Brumble's article is a critical, and, I suggest, unfair, review of Deloria's 1995 
work, Red Earth, White Lies: Native Americans and the Myth of Scientific Fact. 
Brumble's account is fundamentally flawed – it hastily generalizes Deloria as an 
antirationalist who can be grouped with creationists and “melanin” scholars. In doing so, 
Brumble misses Deloria's central points that this thesis seeks to address. Western culture 
has often been dismissive of Indigenous culture and its ability to do inquiry. Another 
Indians and Anthropologist: Vine Deloria, Jr., and the Critique of Anthropology edited by Thomas Biolsi 
and Laddy J. Zimmerman in 1997; Destroying Dogma: Vine Deloria, Jr. and His Influence on American 
Society edited by Steve Pavlik, Daniel R. Wildcat.
My exploration of Deloria as a theologian is scant, though I do reference God Is Red and discuss 
his reference to religion in Spirit & Reason.  Some interesting further study in this might be found in his 
last book, The World We Used to Live In, finished a few days after his passing on November 13, 2005 and 
published posthumously. This work “presents personal experiences and historical accounts of medicine 
men and their extraordinary and inexplicable range of powers . . . [and uses extensive] . . . quotes . . . 
[that] . . . function as evidence of the existence, diversity, and veracity of American Indian medicine men.” 
This account, one might suggest, represents a valuable account of Native American spirituality, as it 
organizes a collection of stories from a variety of ethnographic sources with the addition of Deloria's 
explanation (Norcini, 2008, 110-112). 
Additionally, this work does not address Deloria's extensive work in the legal realm, which is 
important, as Deloria extensively addresses legal struggles for Native American treaty rights in such works 
as Aggressions of Civilization; American Indian Policy In The Twentieth Century; American Indians, 
American Justice; Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties; A Better Day For Indians; A Brief History of the 
Federal Responsibility to the American Indian; The Indian Affair; The Nations Within; We Talk, You Listen; 
and more. 
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point, perhaps most obviously suggested in the title of his book, is that both evolution and
creationism are products of Western metaphysics and thus not the sole options available 
to thinkers. Brumble, in misunderstanding Deloria and reducing his views to essentially 
the same as creationists and melanin scholars, arguably demonstrates his own 
situatedness in the very epistemic attitude that Deloria criticizes. Brumble, in this respect,
essentially commits the false dichotomy fallacy as he offers only two options – either you
adopt a wholesale concurrence with the establishment or else you might as well consider 
yourself an affirmative action antirealist whose views are harmful to society. 
A more favorable description of Deloria's views is offered by Robert Allan 
Warrior's chapter in Tribal Secrets: Recovering American Indian Intellectual Traditions, 
“Intellectual Sovereignty and the Struggle For An American Indian Future.” In this piece,
Warrior suggests that Deloria's stance is that of a post-tribal humanist who has much to 
offer the rest of American society in terms of an epistemology bounded in place. Warrior 
makes the point that Deloria does not simply advocate a return to tradition in the sense of 
going back pre-European contact existence, but rather argues that tradition must be both 
flexible and bounded by community. The truth, he suggests, is that with the changes of 
context in our contemporary situation, the American Indian tradition's strength lies in its 
adaptability. In this view, in that Deloria sees tradition in the Native American sense as 
reflective and open in a way Western epistemology is not, he allows for an opening of 
greater pluralistic possibility.
Additionally, Scott L. Pratt, in “Persons in Place: The Agent Ontology of Vine 
Deloria, Jr.”, suggests that Deloria understands the conflict between European and Native
cultures as a disagreement that is fundamentally philosophical.  In particular, Pratt 
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examines the work jointly authored by Deloria and Daniel Wildcat, Power and Place, so 
as to identify what he calls Deloria's “agent ontology.”  This agent ontology, Pratt 
suggests, might be understood as an Indigenous version of vitalism, with important 
implications for how we ethically and epistemologically relate to a world made up of 
living entities. 
Finally, Daniel Wildcat, in “Indigenizing the Future,” expresses that Deloria's 
view points toward a complex integration operating “on several levels of experience and 
throughout what might be called different spheres of life, without reducing the world to 
materialist mechanisms.” As Wildcat suggests, “Deloria's methodological approach was 
informed by what . . . [Wildcat calls] . . . a modest indigenous epistemological position: 
Knowledge resides in the construction of meaning found in the process of living in the 
world” (Wildcat, 2005, 420).
Wildcat suggests that, with reference to Michel Foucault, there exists an 
ontological fear at work in the history of Western civilization that has informed 
colonization as well as the practice of science. Fear of nature led to a “modern linkage 
between control and knowledge and, later, the identification of technique or science with 
control and therefore, the necessity for 'authorities'” (Wildcat, 2005, 422).
This linkage between control and knowledge is precisely Deloria and 
Feyerabend's point in criticizing Western science as orthodox practice. We might frame 
this as criticism of a certain epistemic attitude more than a wholesale rejection of science 
and its ability to offer an inquiry into clarification of normative constraints, that is, 
tentative physical laws and inductive expectations.
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Reforming Western Metaphysics
Deloria sees tremendous, indispensable value in traditional Native American 
knowledge practices and cultures that are sharply divergent from Western practices.  In 
his view, through an open communication with these indigenous knowledge traditions, 
humanity can adapt to its changing world context. The necessity of this project might be 
better conceived through attention to the ecological degradation facing humanity today. 
Deloria identifies a fundamental emptiness that results from the ontology and 
epistemology that inform both the institution of science and public understanding of 
science – this, I believe, can be well identified with the scientism criticized by 
philosophers such as Paul Feyerabend. The Western epistemic attitude, Deloria argues, is 
so divorced from actual lived experience that it lacks the necessary traits of pluralism and
community required to alleviate the aforementioned emptiness. Such traits, he argues, are
necessary for the maturation necessary for continued growth and flourishing in what he 
identifies as a rapidly changing context of global interconnectedness and technological 
advancement. Additionally, he ties the Western epistemic attitude to a dark history of 
subjugation of non-Western peoples, informed by an evolutionary view of human cultures
that has served to buttress that subjugation.
Thus, one can tie Deloria's epistemological persuasion to his ultimate goal of 
offering an integrated metaphysic that will enable humanity to confront the changing 
context that it has created through the Western project of science and in which it finds 
itself. In his view, a certain maturity is necessary and Deloria's life project, besides his 
goal of advancing the situation of his people in broader American culture and academia, 
was, in large part, to provide an answer to the real problems confronting humanity and 
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the world as a whole.
Overview
This work consists of five chapters. The first is an introduction. The second is an 
exposition of Deloria's criticism of the epistemic attitude that he suggests informs 
Western science in its more traditional, orthodox operation. His account of the play of 
this epistemic attitude, I suggest, is well understood with reference to Sandra Harding's 
terms, “exceptionalism” and “triumphalism”, and Richard Rorty's term, “universal-
realism.” With these terms in mind, we are well suited to follow his account of the 
formation of Western science from its ancient Greek and Judeo-Christian metaphysical 
roots.
The third chapter is a discussion of Deloria's use of Kuhn's notion of paradigms, 
how we might situate Deloria in terms of the problem of demarcation, and why Deloria 
ultimately prefers Feyerabend's epistemological anarchy over Kuhn's account of normal 
science with occasional “revolutions” still situated in the institution of science. Through 
this examination we will have a clearer picture of potential avenues and limits to the sort 
of metaphysics Deloria and Wildcat propose as necessary for a continued planetary 
survival.
Chapter four is an explanation of Deloria's account of indigenous metaphysics, 
primarily using Pratt's suggestion that Deloria provides a conception of the kosmos as a 
vitalistic agent ontology and illustrating how this view informs an Indigenous 
epistemology that is both more open and holistically ethical.
Finally, Chapter five is a summation of the aforementioned ideas, exploring 
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Deloria's particular vision of sovereignty and suggesting that Deloria provides a 
compelling alternative to Feyerabend's epistemology of “anything goes.” This alternative 
is explicated particularly through reference to Daniel Wildcat and what Wildcat calls 
“indigenous realism.”
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CHAPTER II
ORTHODOX SCIENCE
As suggested in the introduction, Deloria offers useful insights into a certain 
epistemic attitude informing the treatment of non-Western knowledge claims, though his 
analysis of scientific practice is somewhat uncharitable. In the previous chapter, I 
suggested that Brumble's analysis of Deloria's work, Red Earth, White Lies, misses a few 
key factors in Deloria's project as well as the history of Western epistemology generally.
Deloria offers a description of the development of Western science, tracing its 
epistemology back to Greek metaphysics on one hand and Judeo-Christian world-denial 
and anthropocentrism on the other.  Along these lines, Deloria points out an epistemic 
attitude that is exclusionary and treats non-Western knowledge claims and practices as 
indicative of an earlier stage of cultural evolution and thus less viable than the hallmark 
knowledge practice of Western science. 
A useful way of understanding this theme is offered by Sandra Harding in Science
From Below through her terms, “exceptionalism” and “triumphalism.” My thought is that
Deloria's criticism of a certain epistemic attitude can be seen to map onto these two 
terms. Accordingly, we shall now begin with a presentation of Deloria's criticism of the 
epistemic attitude as a criticism of an exceptionalist-triumphalist narrative.
An Exceptionalist-Triumphalist Narrative
Deloria states that “Western science today is akin to a world history that discusses 
only the Mediterranean peoples” (Deloria, 1999, 101). Perhaps this quote most succinctly
describes Deloria's gripe with the institution of science. For Deloria, we might suggest, 
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Western science is interwoven with a history of subordination and racism that denies the 
intellectual and cultural viability of non-Western peoples. 
As Daniel Wildcat suggests, Deloria stood apart from many other Indigenous 
philosophers of his time in that “he did not view the Indian knowledge systems . . . as 
artifacts or relics . . . [but] . . . rather as knowledges that should be taken seriously for 
contemporary and practical purposes” (Wildcat, 2005, 425). 
Throughout his works, Deloria evidences a clear desire to give intellectual 
credence to indigenous knowledge-practices in the face of a certain epistemic attitude. In 
his view, this attitude has often been employed such that Native American knowledge 
practices and methods of recording information are relegated to a level regarded as 
inferior to that which is considered proper science.  Accordingly, Deloria states:
Non-Western knowledge is believed to originate from primitive efforts to explain 
a mysterious universe. In this view, the alleged failure of primitive/tribal man to 
control nature mechanically is evidence of his ignorance and his inability to 
conceive of abstract general principles and concepts. (Deloria, 1999, 41)
I will discuss the claim that Western knowledge evidences a penchant toward 
mechanism and abstract principles in the section of this chapter entitled the “The 
Bifurcating Universal Realism of Western Culture.” Ultimately, we will see that Rorty's 
notion of Universal Realism might be conceived as the root of the exclusionary tendency 
discussed here.  First, however, we will explore how Deloria sees this exclusionary 
tendency manifest in the concrete experience of non-Western interactions with Western 
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culture.  
Though he does not use Harding's terms exceptionalism and triumphalism, 
Deloria evidences thinking of orthodox science as involving a tendency to relate to 
Native Americans and other non-Western cultures along the same exceptionalist-
triumphalist lines. As Harding states, “by exceptionalism I mean the belief that Western 
societies alone among all human knowledge systems are capable of grasping reality in its 
own terms . . . [and] . . . only modern Western sciences have demonstrated that they have 
the resources to escape the universal human tendency to project onto nature cultural 
assumptions, fears, and desires” (Harding, 2008, 3-4).  
Native American knowledge practices, from an exceptionalist viewpoint, would 
embody the universal tendency mentioned by Harding in the preceding quote. As Deloria 
states, despite the occasional recurrent use of ancient and tribal knowledge and 
technologies, Western use of such knowledge-practices and technologies “is usually 
accompanied by the patronizing view that although tribals and primitives did originate 
the idea or the practice, they could not have possibly understood the significance” 
(Deloria, 1999, 130). 
I would argue, in addition to exceptionalism devaluing the Indigenous worldview, 
we see an appropriative element at work in communication between Indigenous knowers 
and Western scientific institutions.  We have only to look at the prevalence of tomatoes, 
potatoes, corn and coffee in our diets to see that communication has occurred between 
peoples. Charles Mann, in his bestseller, 1491, presents evidence of Native land use, 
technology, and sophisticated knowledge practices, including unique philosophical ideas, 
prior to European colonization. Much of these knowledges did, in fact, make their way 
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into the Western body of knowledge, though often unacknowledged.  Some examples 
include maize (Mann, 2006, 223), the Iroquois (or Haudenosaunee) influence on 
American democracy and feminism (Mann, 2006, 372-373).
Harding's other term, triumphalism, “assumes that the history of science (which, 
for triumphalists, is thus the exceptionalist history of Western science) consists of a 
narrative of achievements. For triumphalists, this history has no significant downsides” 
(Harding, 2008, 4). What we see at work here is a teleological, Eurocentric perspective in
which the Western scientist proverbially pulls out a plumb and says “what a good boy am
I,” ignoring whatever else or whoever else was involved in getting that plumb. This, 
Deloria argues, more than simply present in obvious scientism, is a fundamental aspect of
the Western epistemology in general.  For Deloria, this “whatever else” might include 
despoliation of the land and cultural annihilation.  This continent has a dark history of 
genocide, as historian Stannard makes clear in his work, American Holocaust.  As he 
states “During the course of four centuries – from the 1490s to the 1890s – Europeans 
and white Americans engaged in an unbroken string of genocide campaigns against the 
native peoples of the Americas” (Stannard, 1992, 147).  His work is a detailed description
of the genocidal history of the Americas and the nigh complete devastation of the 
societies encountered by the Europeans.2
2  There is significant scholarship available on the question of the American genocide, that is, whether the 
devastation of Native American culture and population can be considered genocide. Examples of authors 
who suggest that it was include Alex Alvarez's 2014 Native America and the Question of Genocide; Paul 
Van Develder's 2009 Savages & Scoundrels; Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz's 2014 An Indigenous Peoples' History
of the United States; Russel Thornton's 1987 American Indian Holocaust and Survival; and more. These 
accounts describe in careful detail such aspects of the devastation as the role of direct warfare and 
intentional massacre as well as the ravages of disease, all which seem indisputable.  The issue at debate is 
rather whether what happened to the native population can by definition be considered genocide. Steven 
Kat's 1994 The Holocaust in Historical Context: The Holocaust and Mass Death before the Modern Age 
and William Rubinstein's 2004 Genocide: A History provide counter examples,  essentially taking the 
stance that “the sad fate of America's Indians represents not a crime but a tragedy” (Madley, 2008, 331).
15
  
It is particularly important to bring attention to Deloria's suggestion that the 
Bering Trait theory, the historically prevalent theory that the people now known as 
American Indians came to the western hemisphere from Asian via a land bridge that 
formerly tied the two continents together from Siberia to Alaska, is scientifically 
untenable. With all this in mind, we can better see the motivation for Deloria's critique of 
Western science, as Deloria states, discussing factors he suggests make it hard for 
Western scientists to move away from the Bering Trait theory:
There are immense contemporary political implications to this theory which make
it difficult for many people to surrender. Considerable residual guilt remains over 
the manner in which the Western Hemisphere was invaded and settled by 
Europeans.  Five centuries of brutality lie uneasily on the conscience, and 
consequently two beliefs have arisen which are used to explain this dreadful 
history. People want to believe that the Western Hemisphere, and more 
particularly North America, was a vacant, unexploited, fertile land waiting to be 
put under cultivation according to God's holy dictates. As Woody Guthrie put it: 
'This land is your land, this Land is my land.' The hemisphere thus belonged to 
whoever was able to rescue it from its wilderness state. (Deloria, 1997, 67-68)
Putting forth a cultivation of the wilderness argument, an account of prehistory 
that renders the original Indigenous inhabitants effectively invisible, we might suggest, 
fits the bill of a triumphalist narrative. Deloria continues: 
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Coupled with this belief is the idea that American Indians were not original 
inhabitants of the Western Hemisphere but latecomers who had barely unpacked 
before Columbus came knocking on the door. If Indians had arrived only a few 
centuries earlier, they had no real claim to land that could not be swept away by 
European discovery. (Deloria 1997, 68)
This idea also serves to buttress a triumphalist narrative.  The original Indigenous 
inhabitants are again rendered unimportant and invisible against the force of the 
triumphalist “we are all immigrants anyway” narrative. But what of Western science?
Deloria sees Western Science as emblematic of Western culture's exceptionalist 
propensity to devalue the knowledge-practices and the outcomes of such knowledge-
practices used by non-Western peoples. In this understanding, Western science, as a 
knowledge-practice achieved solely by the descendants of settlers and the alleged 
ultimate proof of the ascendency of Western culture, in a fallacious self-evaluation, can 
be located at the end of a teleological progression, particularly when one considers it a 
triumphalist progression.
The implications of this view, following Harding's definition, is that colonialism 
and the genocide of the colonized peoples are not significantly important factors but even
just a stepping stone toward a more scientific, humanist future. Factors such as climate 
change, threat of nuclear destruction, the evils of conspicuous consumption, etc., are not 
important or else are rendered invisible in the triumphalist narrative of progress. 
This orientation toward triumphalism and exceptionalism has been such, Deloria 
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suggests, that “the Indian explanation is always cast aside as superstition, precluding 
Indians from having an acceptable status as human beings, and reducing them in the eyes 
of educated people to a prehuman level of ignorance” (Deloria, 1997, 7).
While only later couched in evolutionary language, he suggests, this triumphalist-
exceptionalist narrative has been at play in both Western practice of science and religion.  
As Deloria states:
European civilization has a determined and continuing desire to spread its view of
the world to non-European countries. Within a generation of the conquest of 
Mexico, the Spanish had founded schools in Mexico City for the education of 
indigenous youths, and an important part of mission activities for the next three 
hundred years was education of both young people and adults in the Christian 
religion and the niceties of European customs.  (Deloria, 1999, 137)
Accordingly, one can connect Deloria's perception of the exceptionalist-triumphalism of 
Western Science to a hierarchical evolutionary sequence of which Deloria is critical. As 
Deloria states “the predominant – one might say overriding – concern of the influential 
whites of a century ago was somehow to place the savage tribes on the evolutionary 
railroad track to civilization” (Deloria, 1999, 190). As Deloria states, with his usual 
acerbic humor: 
Once the man-ape sequence was established, scientists then believed that a series 
of missing links and 'hopeful monsters' had once existed, arguing that primates 
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had eventually evolved into educated middle-class Western capitalists. It was 
necessary, indeed imperative, to arrange the various human societies on an 
extended incline in which tribal people with a crude mechanical technology 
illustrated the early kinds of human societies and ancient Near Eastern peoples 
became the predecessors of the modern industrial state, moderated eventually by 
the innate gentility of the Anglo-Saxon genes. (Deloria 1997, 48-49)
Again, Western knowledge-practice, whether religious or scientific, is exclusively 
exalted as the natural teleological end-point of all peoples. This is a normative claim and, 
as evidenced here, we saw it play out in Locke's account of proper land use. But what of 
actual scientific theory and practice?
Ultimately, one might suggest, this understanding of the exceptionalist-
triumphalism orientation of Western science simply relates back to the very nature of its 
underpinning epistemological and ontological views.  In this next section, we will explore
the roots of the exceptionalist-triumphalist view, which I suggest is well understood using
neo-pragmatist Richard Rorty's term, “universal-realism.” While Deloria himself has a 
very different account of reality and epistemology than Rorty, I think it is useful toward 
understanding Deloria's criticism of this epistemic attitude as a critique of universal-
realist tendencies.
Universal-realism and Western Science
Rorty suggests that universal realism construes “truth as correspondence to 
reality” such that “procedures of justification must lead to the truth, to correspondence to 
19
reality, to the intrinsic nature of things” (Rorty, 2010, 168-169). Rorty's definition of 
universal-realism is the epistemological view that the “real” can be grasped through 
adequate knowledge practice and the real, in a sense, corresponds to some separate 
universal realm of objectivity. This, I suggest, matches Deloria's own conception of 
Western science's epistemological view. This should become clearer as we progress.  
Perhaps an initial definition of objectivity and subjectivity in the understanding of 
Western philosophy might be useful. Objectivity, according to Perez Zagorin, is 
commonly used to designate any of the following: “first, the true and certain knowledge 
of a thing, property or state of affairs; second, a method of enquiry designed or competent
to elicit a true knowledge, understanding or explanation of a thing, property or state of 
affairs; third, a type of judgment or mental disposition on the part of scientists, scholars, 
moralists, philosophers and other investigators that sets aside prejudice, partiality or 
predetermined answers in the process of any kind of enquiry and the appraisal of its 
results” (Zagorin, 2001, 379).
My thought, however, is that this concept can easily map onto the Ancient Greek 
distinction between “doxa” and “episteme,” which designate opinion as an unreliable 
version of knowledge and true knowledge as a “reflection on scientific knowledge” 
(Mignolo, 2000, 9). In this conception, objectivity then refers to episteme or true 
knowledge, whereas subjectivity is restricted to the realm of doxa or opinion. This 
bifurcation, between subjectivity and objectivity is fundamentally hierarchical. 
Deloria, in his descriptions of the method of science, intends to use something 
closer to Zagorin's third definition of objectivity, that is, a type of judgment or mental 
disposition that sets aside prejudice, partiality or predetermined answers in the process of 
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any kind of enquiry and the appraisal of its results. Importantly, in Deloria's view, the 
fallacious notion of an objective observer supplants the actual subjectivity inherent in 
embodied epistemic situations.  
In Evolution, Creationism, and Other Modern Myths, Deloria describes the nature 
of science as it appears to him:
. . . it appears to be a reasonable effort to gather and interpret data about the world
we live in. When we believe we have found enduring patterns of behavior, we 
tend to formulate propositions that describe what we will probably happen in 
succeeding cases or examples of the same behavior. We can then describe this 
general proposition as 'natural law,' while remembering that it is not law in the 
usual sense. (Deloria, 2002, 43)
He suggests that these laws are not immutable, but rather, subject to change as warranted 
by new observations. In his estimation, neither evolution nor creation meet the criteria to 
be described as scientific. This is interesting if we remember the article by Brumble that I
referred to in the introduction, as it seems definite from Deloria's own words that one 
cannot situate Deloria on either side of the evolution-creationism debate, but rather, one 
might suggest he offers a third option. I feel this is a significant theme in Deloria's work, 
that is, the indigenous radical difference he often proposes when commenting on Western 
bifurcations. Deloria can neither be put in the creationist camp, nor the evolutionist camp.
His intent, as we have suggested, is to criticize the metaphysical foundations of both sides
in this, in his view, uniquely Western cultural battle.
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But what are these key metaphysical concepts?
Metaphysics of the Past
As Deloria states in Red Earth, White Lies, “Even the purest forms of scientific 
and religious expression are rooted in the unconscious metaphysic of the past, and critical
examination of the roots of the basic doctrines in these areas will reveal the inadequacy 
of our beliefs” (Deloria, 1997, 3).  This suggests there is a continuity between Western 
science and religion, arguably stemming from the very origins of Western philosophy. 
Accordingly, Deloria suggests, an important aspect of Western thought is that of 
universalism. He explains, “one of the chief distinguishing characteristics of Western 
peoples in these fields has been the belief that ultimate reality exists over and above the 
transitory experiences of daily life.” In his estimation, as he cites philosopher Arthur O. 
Lovejoy, this belief stemmed from the “platonic dilemma of ensuring the validity of 
human knowledge and Plato's subsequent division of the world into otherworldly and 
thiswordly realms” (Deloria, 2012, 31).  
As we can see, in Deloria's view of Plato, whose philosophy has fundamentally 
influenced Western culture, the real and the good exist somehow above the regular 
phenomena encountered in life. In this view, moreover, knowledge of regular phenomena 
or objects does not constitute an actual grasp of the ultimate qualities of said phenomena 
or object. The project of philosophy, then, constitutes a quest to reveal or more 
completely grasp ultimate reality. 
This, however, seems slightly different from the naive or direct realism we might 
suggest constitutes the scientific view. Realism, from an epistemological standpoint, 
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according to Eftichios Bitsakis, a philosopher from the Department of Physics at the 
University of Athens, Greece, “simply poses the principle of the existence of an objective
world, independent of the subject and accessible to the senses” (Bitsakis, 1993, 166). This
succinct and simple definition of realism, of course, doesn't cover the details of various 
forms of realism, but seems useful for our purposes here. A particular form of realism 
comes into being for Western culture, in Deloria's estimation, with the Ancient Greeks. 
Our goal, then, will be to identify how scientific realism arises from the realism made 
possible through Greek thought.
In Deloria's view, the practice of science, in that it sets out to describe or grasp 
objective reality, adopts a methodology that eliminates the subjective from its analysis. In
this effort, to great effect, science assumes an epistemological stance of direct realism 
which necessarily holds that reality can be directly perceived and understood via the 
reductive method of science, which seeks to break concepts down to their most basic 
elements.
Referencing Democritus, Plato, and Pythagoras, Deloria suggests “Western 
peoples, particularly the Ancient Greeks, concentrated their efforts to explain the physical
universe on determining the ultimate constituent from which all phenomena were 
derived.” From Democritus' atom as the basis of physical reality to Plato's forms to 
Pythagoras' suggestion that mathematics decreed the ultimate determination of the forms 
atoms might take, Western philosophy came to an understanding of objective standards 
informed by particular basic metaphysical concepts of “space, time, matter, energy, and 
causality . . . that have dominated and shaped the Western understanding of the kosmos” 
(Deloria, 1997, 48-49).  
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The Western conception of space, in Deloria's thought, stemmed from system 
devised by the Greek mathematician, Euclid, “which assumed a constant and 
homogenous nature of straight lines and curves for its validity.”  The Euclidian view led 
to Newtonian mechanics, which held that space is “an absolute element in the structure of
the universe” and is, itself, empty (Deloria, 2012, 58).
Also present was the concept of time “as an irreversible, linear progression that 
had a beginning and worked toward a known conclusion.”  Time, divided into absolute 
units of measurement, allowed for recording of history and keeping track of the passage 
of day.  Onto this concept was overlain the idea that the world was created ex nihilo, that 
is, from nothing.  Deloria calls this idea the “doctrine of creation.” This idea, he states, 
seemed sensible to these early thinkers and the average layperson now, as changing 
seasons do exist, aging is a concrete experience, and “change of an irreversible nature 
does occur” through causal relations (Deloria, 2012, 59).
Matter, Deloria states, “to the common person . . . at some level of universal 
existence is an emotional belief verified in everything we experience” (Deloria, 2012, 60-
62). Harkening back to Democritus, “for centuries, the goal of science was to locate and 
identify the smallest particle of matter that composed the kosmos.” While more 
contemporary scientific beliefs have a different view, he suggests, there was a “traditional
belief that matter is irreducible” and was monistic in the sense proposed by Democritus 
and other ancient Greek philosophers who sought to ascertain the single substance that 
composes reality (Deloria, 2012, 60-62).
Causality, Deloria states, informed “nearly every sphere of intellectual 
endeavor . . . [such as the] . . . social sciences, humanities, religion, and law . . . [as well 
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as science,] . . . causality has been a major tool in arranging data in a comprehensible 
format” (Deloria, 2012, 62-65). In the context of religion, he suggests, God is thought to 
have come into the world due to our sinful nature to “balance the scales of cosmic 
justice.” Accompanying this concept of causality are Western ideas such as 
“predestination, free will . . . [and] . . . the belief in the inexorable march of technological
progress.”  Modern science, he states, arose with the primacy of causality in Newtonian 
physics which relied, as discussed above, on the rigidity of absolute time and space 
(Deloria, 2012, 62-65).
Deloria states elsewhere that these metaphysical conceptions ultimately isolate 
humankind and he suggests that, particularly important to this phenomenon of isolation, 
are Sir Issac Newton, Descartes, and Leibnitz, for, the idea that “one cannot trust sense 
perceptions, human emotions, or the intuitional abilities of the human personality . . . 
[though going] . . . as far back as the Greek philosophers and prophetic movement in 
Israel . . . was not a dominating factor in Western existence until . . . Descartes, Leibnitz, 
and Newton demonstrated the efficiency of the mathematical description of the physical 
world” (Deloria, 1978, 12).
Here we return to the idea that an ultimate reality exists behind the scenes of daily
phenomena.  As we have presented, with this view, the contrast between episteme and 
doxa informs the reductionist Western scientific view in that a clear distinction between 
objectivity and subjectivity is made with former valued over the latter.  In this view, there
is a fundamental hierarchical valuation made in which objectivity is the superior and 
subjectivity the inferior, at least in terms of justifying true belief.  Our task now, however,
is to describe how Deloria suggests that ancient Greek metaphysics and Judeo-Christian 
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anthropocentrism led to Western science. Ironically, this journey takes us fully into 
subjective territory where Deloria argues that the so-called strict objectivity of Western 
science rests ultimately on subjective concepts.  
We have stressed the foundational importance of Isaac Newton's conceptions of 
the universe as “a giant, self-operating clock.” Newton, with this theory, pictured the 
“world as a secular machine, devoid of religion overtones, yet created by a benign 
watchmaker who enjoyed human efforts to discern universal secrets” (Deloria, 2012, 50-
51). Deloria suggests the rise of theism and deism, alternatives to traditional Christian 
theology, of this time were connected intimately to the Newtonian conception. This 
theory was accepted ardently in its time, so much so, that many thought ultimate reality 
had finally been captured by natural philosophy. Thus, these particular metaphysical 
concepts were concretely ground into the practice of science until Einstein and others 
challenged the traditional view. Here we see the rise of secularism, though actual 
scientific practice at this time was still grounded in the concept of a deity.  
To reiterate the connection between science and religion under the same rubric of 
Western metaphysics, Deloria suggests the reductive method of the science tradition 
would not have been possible without a merger of “the command of Genesis to 'subdue 
the earth' . . . [with] . . . Greek conceptualizations of the structure of the universe.” This 
merger resulted in the “Western scientific spirit of inquiry” (Deloria, 2012, 55).  
Outlining this movement more concretely elsewhere, Deloria states, “Beginning 
with Socrates and Plato and culminating in the thought of Aristotle, the Greek 
philosophical tradition understood the world of senses as a pale and imperfect 
representation of a realm of eternal ideas and essences.”  The practice of Aristotelian 
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natural philosophy sought to classify and distinguish taxonomies of creatures, supposing 
that absolute forms of these creatures existed toward which all the individual various 
creatures aspired and thus the biological world was given purpose and human ethics were
given meaning and ability to shape “the process of life in the universe.” This tradition 
was combined with the Christian tradition's anthropocentric idea that “nature was 
subordinate to man” (Deloria, 2012, 68-69). 
 Thus, we have what Deloria claims is the Western scientific spirit of inquiry, 
which contains a theme of anthropocentric mastery over nature as well as the Greek 
method of categorization and search for the immutable. This is a very interesting 
development when one recalls that Western science, as practiced today, seeks to eliminate
the subjectivity of non-empirically verifiable claims and biases. Deloria's accompanying 
claim, it seems, is that science has not eliminated a certain fundamental element of 
subjectivity in the sense of an underlying adherence to basic metaphysical concepts.  
Deloria states, “this underlying belief that science testifies to the existence and 
genius of deity remains with us, and Einstein's insistence that God does not play dice 
reflects this unconscious and rarely articulated tie between Western science and religion.”
Such an expression reveals an underlying belief that “nature is orderly” and therefore 
scientific inquiry “originates in theological beliefs.” This necessary reliance by science 
on orderliness is thus “an article of faith” (Deloria, 2012, 56-57).
It is important to note here that Deloria is not deriding the presence of this idea in 
scientific practice.  He is rather pointing out its necessary presence and science's ultimate 
reliance on a subjectively grounded first principle of order that originates in theological 
belief.  Interestingly, he adds, “Even this belief . . . [in the fundamental orderliness of 
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nature] . . . however, is subject to abuse if it becomes a dogmatic article of faith rather 
than a presupposition that can be adapted to fit new circumstances” (Deloria 2012, 57). 
The Division of Religion and Science
As we have outlined, in Deloria's account, the history of science did not begin 
with a strict division between religion and science. Western science's anthropocentrism, 
derived from the merger of Biblical account of creation and Greek philosophy, 
underpinned the practice of science and informed its attitude toward the world. The basic 
notion that nature was created for man's benefit changed little, but was secularized.   
Deloria suggests that the ensuing universalism-realism, prior to Newton and 
Darwin, still operated largely under the reign of a religious account of creation, but, 
gradually, the secular philosophy of humanism began to replace religion's role.  
Though the march toward secularization was imminent, Newton still required the 
hypothesis of a god to make his account of the solar system work. Accordingly, he 
conceived of a clockwork universe created by a deity. This idea, of course, was just as 
important to the biological realm. As Deloria states, “Because the origin of species was a 
theological principle as much as a scientific doctrine, which understood the biological 
world as a product of instantaneous creation at a specific time in the past, few thinkers 
saw any possibility of species being other than they were observed to be” (Deloria, 2012, 
69).
From Deloria's view, Charles Darwin's famous voyage would more completely 
secularize science. As Deloria states, “From numerous questions that arose from his 
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observations of plants, animals, and birds on his several journeys on the ship Beagle, 
Darwin was led to question the rigid interpretation of the origin of species that saw plant 
and animal life as a stable product of creation week.”  Here Deloria presents a brief 
overview of Darwin's theory which he suggests Darwin supported with three main 
principles, namely: the obvious presence of random variations in species that likely 
corresponded to generational changes, the necessity of some limiting principle so as to 
avoid chaos in the biological world, and finally, that “only the fittest member of each 
species would survive, and only those species that made the proper adaptions would 
continue to exist.” As Deloria suggests, the implications of this theory were radical. 
Humankind suddenly no longer held its old privileged place in the cosmos, created as “a 
special creature made in the image of God” (Deloria, 2012, 69-72).
Literal biblical accounts of prehistory were challenged by this new account. Going
back to our discussion of the key metaphysical concepts underpinning Western science, 
we should draw attention to the concept of time.  As Deloria states, “the idea of linear 
time was uncritically accepted as the proper framework within which the physical world 
could be understood – because science was merely offering secular alternatives to sacred 
concepts.”  This idea of linear time, he suggests, was maximized as evolution allowed for
the existence of nigh “endless eons of time” (Deloria, 2002, 161).
The common understanding, or misunderstanding, of this new theory of evolution 
was, however, not so distant from the previous religious understanding.  The concept of 
the survival of the fittest, Deloria states, “had the most practical appeal to the common 
people . . . [and] . . . fits perfectly with the religious maxim that 'God helps those that help
themselves.”  Accordingly, he suggests, this concept was used in all manner of fields such
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that “we speak about the self-made man and attribute individual financial and social 
success to the inexorable workings of the principle of evolutionary change” (Deloria, 
2012, 73). It seems, on this account, that Western religion has succeeded in many ways to
weather the changes brought on by the theory of evolution. We will return to this shortly, 
after we comment on the continuing development of science into the social sphere.    
Moreover, “the great seminal years of anthropology, sociology, psychology, and 
comparative religions coincided with the evolution controversy, and the pioneer thinkers 
in those social sciences saw in evolution a means of interpreting their data that seemed 
both reasonable and adequate.” With this movement, Deloria reasons, we see the 
exceptionalist and triumphalist narrative play out, as the pioneers of these social sciences,
following a mistaken understanding of evolution, “came to believe that societies . . . [and 
their corresponding beliefs, values and practices] . . . had all evolved from simple, 
primitive, and superstitious fears into the complicated and sophisticated organizations, 
attitudes, and beliefs we see today” (Deloria, 2012, 73).
Through a review of Deloria's account of this history, we have identified the 
ambiguous relationship of Western science to its religious heritage which Western science
came to, increasingly, reject as it moved to an ever-increasing level of secularization with
perhaps the key moment being the advent of Darwin's theory of evolution.  
Interestingly, it is here that, despite the shared metaphysical underpinnings, 
science successfully discarded religion in many ways and the two came to exist in an 
antagonistic relation, according to Deloria. As he states, “one might better characterize 
the history of Western thought as a continuous struggle between religion and science, 
with metaphysics, occasionally attempting to provide a systematic ordering of the 
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doctrines and beliefs of both.” In the play of this phenomenon, Deloria cites problems 
with attempts to merge the religion and science gap, as “the methodological assumptions 
of Western knowledge are designed to maintain this isolation” (Deloria, 2012, 22-23).
As we have discussed, in Deloria's view, the universal-realism of Western science 
adopts a reductionist stance that renders invalid subjective accounts of knowledge.  This, 
we can see, renders subjective beliefs, such as those of religion, as equivalent to mere 
doxa, while the objective knowledge of science reigns primary as true knowledge or 
episteme.  Necessarily included in the subjectivity rendered obsolete are all elements of 
the affective dimension.  As Deloria suggests, the quest for certainty in Western 
philosophy and culture progressed to the point that “logical and analytic explanation of 
human reality . . . have eliminated the human emotions and intuitive insights of the 
original experience and in their place have substituted a systematic rendering of human 
knowledge concerning the natural world” (Deloria, 2012, 201).
The limits of this reductionism will become more apparent as well discussion 
Deloria's account of Native metaphysics in the following chapter. 
Conclusion
Universal-realism itself is, arguably, what makes exceptionalist-triumphalism 
possible, as the Western scientist becomes the sole arbiter of what is true knowledge or 
episteme, while all others, including non-Western peoples and those interested in the 
spiritual dimension of human experience must agree that their knowledge practices being 
generally categorized as doxa.
With a Darwinian explanation and the triumph of secularism, in Deloria's view, 
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non-Western people and their knowledge-practices were evaluatively reduced to the 
superstitious, primitive activity of pre-scientific societies.  Additionally, in the rejection 
of all other forms of knowledge than those derived exclusively from the method of 
Western science, Deloria suggests that much is left out that would benefit humanity. This 
will become particularly obvious as, following reference to Paul Feyerabend, we discuss 
the advantages of taking a non-exceptionalist approach to epistemology and metaphysics 
via some examples of Indigenous knowledges that Deloria mentions. If we are to accept 
Deloria's view, to move past the devaluation of non-Western knowledge practice, it seems
necessary to reject many of the limiting beliefs of Western science. Fortunately, as I shall 
argue in the next chapter, Deloria provides a potential way out of a strict adherence to this
universal-realist, exceptionalist-triumphalist paradigm with attention to unorthodox 
voices from Western philosophy and science. 
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CHAPTER III
REBELS OF SCIENCE
In this chapter, I explicate Deloria's understanding of Paul Feyerabend and 
Thomas Kuhn.  Kuhn's notion of paradigms offers some substance to an argument for a 
Delorian alternative to the more exclusionary account of science discussed in the 
preceding chapter. However, in comparing the two thinkers, Deloria ultimately favors 
Feyerabend and his notion of epistemic anarchy.  We will explore why as the chapter 
unfolds. I begin with Deloria's suggestion that Western science commits what Whitehead 
called the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, alternatively understood in the thought of 
William James as vicious abstractionism.  Also, Deloria's account of alternative 
knowledge will necessarily run into the question of demarcation, especially with 
reflection on Brumble's suggestion that pseudoscientists, such as creationists or Deloria 
himself, take the stance of self-described modern-day Galileos. 
To begin with, Paul Feyerabend suggests that pseudoscience is ultimately a sort of
empty or even nonsensical term, according to historian Michael D. Gordin (Gordin, 2012,
10-11). For Feyerabend, “There is no idea, however, ancient and absurd, that is not 
capable of improving our knowledge” (Feyerabend, 1988, 33).
As might be expected, Feyerabend's ideas will prove to be particularly useful, and 
Deloria prefers him to Kuhn for the reason that his epistemic anarchy allows for a greater 
degree of openness to alternative perspectives and practices beyond Kuhn's account of 
normal science and revolutionary science, which, in Deloria's view, is ultimately 
exclusively dependent upon the scientific establishment. In this sense, Kuhn cannot be 
seen to provide an escape from the exceptionalist-triumphalist orientation of Western 
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science.
With reference to Deloria, I have discussed how the exceptionalist-triumphalist 
persuasion of Western science, informed by a particular reductionist universal-realist 
epistemological orientation, renders non-Western perspectives invalid or greatly 
diminished.  Deloria suggests that while, in some cases, Western science has 
begrudgingly admitting to the contribution of non-Western knowledges, this has usually 
been in an appropriative sense in which the non-Western knowledge is thought to have 
been achieved by a people who didn't really understand what they had discovered through
essentially unreliable, overly subjective means. In this view, the route to true 
understanding or episteme, that is, the ability to pierce through a veil of subjective biases 
or doxa, is achieved only by the reductive method of “objective” science. The viability of 
more subjective endeavors is decried.  A prevalent, misbegotten, epistemic attitude, in 
Deloria's view, supposes that the world is wholly mechanistic while denying and 
rendering invisible the subjective dimension of its own practice. 
In relation to the problems of this reductionist objectivity, Deloria identifies the 
“fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” which he suggests is “one of the fallacies that Alfred
North White identified within the Western philosophical tradition.” This fallacy is the 
“belief that the principles of philosophy were 'clear, obvious, and irreformable'” (Deloria,
1999, 3).  
To quote Whitehead, “There is an error; but it is merely the accidental error of 
mistaking the abstract for the concrete. It is an example of what I will call the 'Fallacy of 
Misplaced Concreteness'" (Whitehead, 1997, 51). As suggested by Whitehead, this 
fallacy is the mistaken assumption that one's abstract concept or belief about reality is 
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itself equivalent to a concrete reality. I will discuss this concept by further connecting it 
to William James' similar notion of vicious abstractionism.
Misplaced Concreteness
This same fallacy we have outlined is also referred to by Williams James in The 
Meaning of Truth, wherein he suggests that rationalistic idealists such as Kant and Hegel 
abstracted in such a way as to reduce concrete situations solely to the way in which they 
had categorized it. When one, rather than using the concept to aid in further 
understanding of a complex and rich phenomenon, instead suggests that the phenomenon 
is “a case of 'nothing but' that concept,” one commits what James terms “vicious 
abstractionism” (James, 1979, 135-136).
This seems to line up with Deloria's view on what I have identified as the 
universal-realist commitment of Western thought that we discussed in the last chapter. 
The exceptionalism of Western science, in this scheme of thought, commits the fallacy as 
well. For Deloria, besides failing to acknowledge the viability of Indigenous 
epistemology, Western science's tendency to commit this fallacy leaves out many other 
potentially useful accounts and perspectives in the pursuit of knowledge. This 
problematically reduces the methodology of Western science and thus the acquisition of 
knowledge in general. In line with Feyerabend's basic thesis,  Deloria states 
“Reductionism is about the least efficient way to garner knowledge” (Deloria, 1999, 14). 
As we have discussed, for Deloria, this fallacy describes the adherence of Western
science to particular universal concepts in what we might call its particular universal-
realist orientation.  Universal-realism commits the fallacy by treating abstractions from 
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particular inquiries as if they (and not the particular result) are the real thing. The 
universals are treated as concrete rather than the particulars. In Deloria's view, this 
orientation, and thus this fallacy, informs the exceptionalist-triumphalist persuasion of 
Western science. Deloria is both suggesting that the paradigm by which much of Western 
science operates is largely outmoded and that the perspectives of non-Western knowers 
are vitally important to encounter. The particular solution Deloria seeks, however, is not 
to be found in Kuhn's understanding but rather Feyerabend's. Deloria cites both and it 
will be important to discuss how Deloria suggests these thinkers differ and why he 
prefers Feyerabend's account.  I begin first with a discussion of correlation and causation.
This is interesting in that it presents a significant challenge to the universalist-realist 
perspective.  It seems difficult to viciously abstract the contents of experience when one 
is forced to give up, in some sense, on absolute deductive or inductive certainty.
Correlation or Causation?
Deloria suggests a movement toward the approach of “reconciling what we think 
we know about the universe – the empirical data and interpretations of subjects we can 
describe mathematically – with our aesthetic, emotional, and mental apprehensions of the
same universe” (Deloria, 2002, 64). I suggest that Deloria holds a similarly skeptical 
position to Rorty on what I have identified as the universal-realist epistemology 
informing Western philosophy and science. On the other hand, Deloria seems to affirm 
the value of Western knowledge production and suggests that there is a way in which the 
two are compatible. 
Western technology, Deloria suggests, “might indeed be useful in repairing the 
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damages already done to tribal lands so that the lands can once again be put on a 
traditional use pattern and become productive” (Deloria, 2001, 65). Deloria grants this, 
but seems skeptical of Western science generally, in light of the facts that the damage 
done to tribal lands is a result of Western operations and styles of land management. 
It is important to note that both Indigenous people and Western people make use 
of technology and develop techniques in relation to lived experience. The Six Nations, for
instance, had a “basically religious knowledge of plants and animals . . . [and] . . . 
traditionally planted beans, corn, and squash together . . . [calling these plants] . . . the 
famous 'Three Sisters' who provided the people with food.” Eventually, as Western 
science “discovered the nitrogen cycle,” attention was given to how this knowledge 
“provided a natural nitrogen cycle so that the fields were never worn out from farming” 
(Deloria, 1999, 130-131). Deloria states, however, that the two systems of thought, “tribal
and Western scientific . . . do not seem to be radically different, but in actual application 
they diverge radically” (Deloria, 1999, 68).
At the same time, Deloria states, for the Indian, there was no “firm belief in cause 
and effect, which plays such an important role in Western science and thinking . . . 
[rather] . . . Indians were well aware that when a certain sequence of things began, certain
other elements or events would also occur . . . [thus resulting in] . . . a kind of 
predictability . . . present in Indian knowledge of the natural world” (Deloria, 2001, 26). 
Examples of use of such correlations include, Deloria states, “designating the bear as a 
medicine animal, owls as forecasting death or illness, and snakes as anticipating 
thunderstorms” (Deloria, 2001, 27).
This willingness to grant legitimacy to such claims as the appearance of an owl 
37
indicating coming death or illness might seem problematic from the get-go. It is 
important, however, to keep in mind that Deloria himself has problems with “alleged 
medicine men who were busy peddling a new form of Indian religion that centered 
primarily on recycled slogans concerning 'Mother Earth' . . . [but] . . . asked little in the 
way of personal commitment . . . [while exempting] . . . an individual from the guilt that 
involvement with contemporary industrial society inevitably created” (Deloria, 1999, 
235).
The key points, I think, are that, on the one hand, Deloria has some standard as to 
appropriate uses of correlation, that is, in the context of a body of traditional, community-
bound knowledge, versus inappropriate, manipulative contemporary use for financial or 
social gain. On the other hand, Deloria criticizes the outright disregard of Indigenous 
knowledge production. 
I will discuss this alternative form of knowledge in the following chapter, but, for 
present concerns, it seems enough to say that Deloria challenges the certainty of the 
Western method, which he states “is so well controlled by doctrine that it often denies 
experiences that could provide important data for consideration” (Deloria, 2001, 28).  The
difference between correlation and causation can be summed as the difference between 
saying “rain comes when the clouds are dark” and “it rains because the clouds are dark.” 
The latter is a much more open-ended account of the phenomenon, still noticing 
connections between dark clouds and rain, but much more hesitant about claims of causal
certainty. In some sense, we might say, then, that Deloria values experiential knowledge, 
but intentionally avoids the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.  
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Problem of Demarcation
In tandem with the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, it is important to bring up 
an issue at the heart of science – the problem of demarcation. This problem refers to the 
difficulty in saying whether some particular practice is science or not. Further still, we 
might suggest that is refers to whether we can say some claim is eligible to be a 
knowledge claim or not. A good example to introduce this subject is through Deloria's 
discussion of the McLean v. the Supreme Court case, which concerned the question of 
whether “Creation science” could be properly defined as scientific, and therefore, 
permissible as subject matter fit for a public school curriculum. In this case, the Supreme 
Court “offered a list of what is considered the essential elements of scientific thinking.” 
Through recounting this list, Deloria is attempting to point out how the courts themselves
lack an accurate understanding of what constitutes proper science. From this example, I 
think, we can glean a few insights into Deloria's view of science aside from his seemingly
usual pejorative account.  According to Deloria, it was agreed by the court that science is 
characterized by a few key rules as follows:
1. It is guided by natural laws.
2. It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law.
3. It is testable against the empirical world.
4. Its conclusions are tentative – that is, they are not necessarily the final word.
5. It is falsifiable.
(Deloria, 2002, 31-32)
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Deloria, following this list, suggests that the key elements of scientific thinking 
are falsifiability and the tentative nature of conclusions.  He seems to take particular issue
with the concept of natural laws, stating that “people outside science seem to give 
considerably more credence to the absolute nature of “natural law” than do people within 
science (Deloria, 2002, 33). 
We have discussed, to some extent, point number 3 in the section “A Problem of 
Correlation and Causation.”  Of particular interest here, however, are points one, two and 
five.  
Seeking a definition of natural law, Deloria concludes that “natural law . . . [is] . . .
an expression of averaging countless numbers of unique events to formulate general 
principles of change and predictability . . . [with human reason acting as] . . . the 
expression of man's adaption to what is normally there, and this is deposited in 
complexes of ideas which, organizing themselves step by step, constitute objective 
values” (Deloria, 2002, 34). This raises issues for the status of scientific statements as 
anything but statistical truths, again questioning the idea that science is entitled to the 
exclusive claims of certainty that Deloria sees it has claimed to have in popular 
understanding. This directly leads to the problem of demarcation.
According to professor of history, Michael Gordin, “the term' demarcation 
problem' was coined by a young Austrian philosopher named Karl Popper in 1928 or 
1929” in response to “the confirmation in 1919 of Albert Einstein's general theory of 
relativity.”  Popper contrasted Einstein's audacious predictions with the ideas of 
psychoanalysis in that the latter lacked a predictive nature that could be proved or 
disproved, but rather, relied upon confirmation. Popper wanted to formulate a means of 
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demarcating science from non-science.  As Gordin quotes him, “the criterion of the 
scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability” (Gordin, 
2012, 7). 
Popper's method, as Gordin suggests, fails to achieve a solid demarcation.  
Philosophy of science, he states, has long abandoned falsificationism as it fails to ascribe 
to actual scientific practice and because it does not actually accomplish what it purports 
to accomplish.  As regarding the first failure, scientific practice actually commonly 
involves what Popper “dismissed as the 'unscientific' generation of ad hoc hypotheses to 
immunize a theory.” Secondly, “if all a theory has to do in order to count as a scientific is 
make bold claims that might be proven false, then many doctrines deemed 
pseudoscientific pass muster.”  Gordin suggests that Creationism, parapsychology, and 
Velikovsky's catastrophism all make predictive statements, which fits the bill for Popper's
falsifiability (Gordin, 2012, 8-9).
Following Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Gordin states, 
“many looked to . . . his central argument of paradigms as a possible site of demarcation .
. . [though] . . . Kuhn rarely invoked the demarcation problem” (Gordin, 2012, 9).  As we 
discuss Kuhn's notion of paradigms, it will become clear why. 
Nature of Paradigms
Deloria suggests that Western science has a tendency toward ossification.  This, 
we might say, is the manifestation of the same phenomena we saw at work when 
discussing Western science's tendency toward exceptionalist-triumphalist narratives and 
the reductionism of the universal-realist methodology at work. Indeed, as Deloria states:
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Scientific knowledge progresses very slowly because people in science are 
reluctant to change any of their ideas until the evidence for new interpretations of 
data is so compelling as to make them seem foolish maintaining the outmoded 
doctrines. (Deloria, 1997, 137-138)
It seems useful here to describe Kuhn's notion of paradigms as informing the 
movement of science.  Kuhn states, “Close historical investigation of a given specialty at 
a given time discloses a set of recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of various 
theories in their conceptual, observational, and instrumental applications” These, he 
states, can be called the community's paradigms (Kuhn 43). As historian Michael D. 
Gordin states, 
According to Kuhn, science consists of periods of stasis (“normal science”), in 
which scientists solve puzzles within the framework of a general schema of 
reasoning, which he called a paradigm. As anomalies – experimental findings that 
prove difficult to reconcile with the dominant paradigm – pile up, occasionally a 
rupture occurs (“paradigm shift”), and the old paradigm is replaced by a new one, 
and normal science then continues apace in this framework. (Gordin, 2012, 9)
Deloria seems to concur with this notion, stating, “Science further limits itself by 
insisting that all data fall within the reigning interpretive paradigm of the time . . . 
[which] . . . enables scientists to classify data and verify whether or not it falls within the 
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accepted mode of interpretation.” A paradigm, in Kuhn's view of science as a puzzle 
solving venture, Deloria suggests, allows scientists to choose problems to analyze while 
discarding other problems that are deemed unworthy of analysis due to difficulty, being 
too metaphysical, or not the concern of the discipline investigating the problem (Deloria, 
1999, 45). This methodology, he suggests, is problematic. Many options that might be 
useful for the advancement of knowledge are discarded. 
Returning briefly to the question of why Kuhn rarely invoked the demarcation 
problem, we might return to Gordin, who suggests that “if paradigms by definition decide
what is scientific and what is not, then any statement outside the paradigm could 
conceivably be designated psuedoscientific.”  Those outside the scientific institution, 
Gordin suggests, had employed this idea, even those regarded as psuedoscientists, such as
Velikovsky, who suggest that a paradigm shift is necessary (Gordin, 2012, 9).
Deloria agrees with this statement that any knowledge production outside the 
paradigm might be declared pseudoscientific, suggesting that through a communication 
that validates the Indigenous point of view, the store of human knowledge might be 
bettered.  In his view, this necessitates a paradigm shift, as the old exceptionalist-
triumphalist account of Western science is outmoded, to allow for a non-appropriative 
contribution of Indigenous knowledge to the body of human knowledge.  
For Deloria, however, though the notion of paradigms is clearly useful, Kuhn 
doesn't go far enough.  In his thought, Feyerabend provides a much more accurate 
account of epistemology.  We will now discuss Deloria's preference of Feyerabend over 
Kuhn, discussing their similarities and differences.
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Feyerabend and Kuhn
We might suggest that Deloria uses the idea of paradigm shift to escape the 
categorization of indigenous knowledges as mere pseudoscience.  Under Kuhn's account 
of paradigms, all ideas falling outside of the prevalent paradigm might be categorized as 
pseudoscientific practice, thus rendering the demarcation problem largely meaningless. 
However, in that Deloria ultimately seeks, at least in his works prior to Power and Place, 
a way for Western science to communicate with Indigenous knowledge-practice, it is 
necessary for us to discuss the concept of incommensurability.
Incommensurability, denoting the absence of a common measure between 
paradigms, leads to problems of communication between paradigms.  This concept 
appears in the thought of both Feyerabend and Kuhn, as the two both “used the term 
'incommensurable' to describe certain aspects of dramatic theoretical transitions in the 
course of scientific advance.” Kuhn's use of the term was to suggest an inability for 
communication between differing paradigms due to taxonomical differences (Oberheim, 
2005, 364-365). Similarly, “Feyerabend's notion of incommensurability is intended to 
capture the idea of conceptual incompatibility due to changes of meaning that occur in 
theoretical transitions that affect our ontological beliefs . . . [as] . . . two fundamental 
theories are incommensurable because the meanings of their terms are determined by the 
theoretical principles that govern their correct use, and these principles are qualitatively 
incompatible” (Oberheim, 2005, 370).
We have identified substantial differences in terms of the practice of Western 
science and Indigenous forms of knowing.  How can the dissimilar paradigms of Western 
science and Indigenous knowledge-practice speak to one another? 
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An answer to this question might be found via an examination of the differences 
between the two thinkers in terms of their ultimate orientation toward epistemology and 
the hierarchical status of Western science. As Deloria states, “Both Feyerabend and Kuhn 
agree that the best advances in science and philosophy are made by the outsider, a 
conclusion not difficult to reach but exceedingly difficult to accept emotionally” (Deloria,
1999, 7). We have seen this discussion via Kuhn's contrasting notions of normal science 
and scientific revolutions which eventually alters what constitutes normal science. 
However, Deloria wants to suggest that Feyerabend has a fundamentally different 
conception of the origin of ideas. As he states, “Kuhn's agent of change is presumed to be
approved by the establishment; his creators of the new paradigm presuppose the uniform 
march of orthodox science with a few excited changes in perspective.”  Feyerabend, he 
suggests, holds absolutely that “ideas should be judged by the potential for making a 
contribution to understanding, not on their origin, former use, or relationship to accepted 
symbols of contemporary authority” (Deloria, 1999, 7-8).  In this view, Deloria suggests, 
the contribution of views usually deemed too mythological or too primitive to be of 
epistemological merit can be acknowledged as a source of understanding. 
In contrast, Kuhn falls short of being the sort of rebel Deloria is seeking in that, in
Deloria's estimation, he effectively “endorses the very situation that he has promised to 
criticize and explain” in that he advocates a kind of group intuition rather than individual 
intuitions.  This, for Deloria, has Kuhn effectively contradicting himself in that Kuhn 
seems to suggest that outside voices are necessary for the advance of science but that 
intuition necessarily comes out of the in-group (Deloria, 1999, 8-9). To quote Kuhn 
himself, “Anomaly appears only against the backdrop provided by the paradigm” (Kuhn, 
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1996, 65). 
 We might recall the discussion of exceptionalist-triumphalist narratives as 
Deloria suggests that Kuhn and Feyerabend differ fundamentally in their epistemological 
understanding in that “Kuhn feels that Western information gathering is unquestionably 
superior . . . [while] . . . Feyerabend is certainly no doctrinaire worshiper of Western 
science . . . [but] . . . delights in pointing out the many advances made by our ancestors, 
of all cultural traditions . . . that were fundamental to and underlay all our more recent 
scientific accomplishments”  (Deloria, 1999, 10).  We see here a definite opening to the 
sort of validation of Indigenous knowledge that Deloria seeks. 
As Deloria states, “Feyerabend is one of the few voices that sees that the body of 
human knowledge is not merely an instance of adding insights of non-Western peoples to 
the already constructed edifice of Western knowledge but . . . [rather] . . . derived from 
the many human traditions represented in planetary history” (Deloria, 1999, 5). To further
clarify this point, it seems useful to comment on Feyerbend's overarching thesis, which 
suggests that “Science is an essentially anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more 
humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives” 
(Feyerabend, 1988, 9). Accordingly, we may suggest the pursuit of knowledge, for 
Feyerabend, includes a fundamentally ethical dimension. As he states, “The attempt to 
increase liberty, to lead a full and rewarding life, and the corresponding attempt to 
discover the secrets of nature and of man entails, therefore, the rejection of all universal 
standards and of all rigid traditions. (Naturally, it also entails the rejection of a large part 
of contemporary science)” (Feyerabend, 1995, 12).
Perhaps connecting to this concern of Feyerabend for a fundamentally ethical 
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dimension to knowledge, Deloria states, 
Much of Western science must go, all of Western religion should go, and if we are
in any way successful in ridding ourselves of these burdens, we will find that we 
can fundamentally change government so that it will function more sensibly and 
enable us to solve our problems. (Deloria, 1997, 3)
These problems, we might suggest, are more than just technological hurdles, but attend 
more to existential questions and how we can attend to human and environmental well-
being. 
Conclusion
Again, to sum up the connection between Deloria and Feyerabend, “It is clear, 
then, that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality, rests on too naive 
a view of man and his social surroundings” (Feyerabend, 1988, 19). As we have 
discussed, Deloria maintains that Western science's exceptionalist-triumphalist 
orientation is short-sighted and ultimately an outmoded paradigm.  For Deloria, Western 
science denies the viability of Indigenous thought, thus exemplifying, we might say, an 
incommensurability on the part of Western science. This is, however, one-sided, we might
argue, looking at how the Indigenous view cannot be categorized as a universal-realist 
epistemology, as we have discussed. Finding an alternative to the either-or 
epistemological method of Western science, in Deloria's view, Indigenous knowledge 
retains an openness to novel ideas and anomalies that Western science rejects.  Not being 
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influenced by the history we discussed in the first chapter, Indigenous epistemology will 
take some other form of realism than universal-realism. This will become clearer as we 
delve into a more detailed discussion of an Indigenous science of relationality and 
defining Deloria's epistemology.
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CHAPTER IV
VITALISTIC KOSMOS
Perhaps a good way to begin is to directly state that Deloria maintains that Native 
American metaphysics are fundamentally different than Western metaphysics. As he 
states in the introduction to the Metaphysics of Modern Existence, “The fundamental 
factor that keeps Indians and non-Indians from communicating is that they are speaking 
about two entirely different perceptions of the world” (Deloria, 2012, 1).
In this chapter I will describe some of the key characteristics of the Indian 
metaphysics Deloria describes in his writings. The section is accordingly divided first 
into a discussion of ontology, focused on an analysis based around the familiar 
designations of the one and the many, in two sections, as it appears in Native ontology.  
This is followed by a brief description of human purpose in Native American thought, 
preparing us for the concluding discussion in the fifth and final chapter.
Previously, in chapter three, we outlined a number of important concepts in 
Western metaphysics, as suggested by Deloria, as follows: space, time, matter, energy, 
and causality. Additionally, we discussed at some length the metaphysical view, which we
can identify as universal-realism, and its accompanying exceptionalist-triumphalism 
narrative, which he purports defines the Western view. The Native view, we shall see, 
much more concretely attends to the contents of experience. Additionally, Natives, 
without the bifurcations of the universal-realist view and thus with a fundamentally more 
open engagement with reality, approach knowledge in a much more holistic manner, 
aiming at understanding in a way that includes both the physical and spiritual dimensions.
This is accomplished via an alternative method he calls “correspondence” that 
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engages reality via a knowledge-practice that is fundamentally moral and affirms an 
expansive account of agency. Persons in this view include not just human communities, 
but a living universe, that is, a vitalistic kosmos. We can call this an agent-ontology. This 
difference in epistemology and ontology, we might suggest, entails an ethical 
consideration in a way that the Western tradition lacks the conceptual tools to accomplish.
Deloria outlines an agent ontology in Power and Place that involves what he 
suggests as a simple equation: “power and place produce personality.”  This equation 
works such that “the universe is alive, but it also contains within it the very important 
suggestion that the universe is personal and, therefore, must be approached in a personal 
manner” (Deloria, 2001, 23). Pratt describes the ontology Deloria outlines as an agent 
ontology, stating “In effect, the universe has an agent ontology where its entities are 
persons whose particular character will be a matter of their interactions and where 
knowledge will be a matter of knowing their personalities” (Pratt, 2006, 5). 
This agent ontology involves a few key components. On one hand, it is important 
to discuss the nature of the kosmos as the one, that is, as the monistic whole, the being, of
all existence as it has frequently been discussed in Western philosophy. On the other it is 
important to discuss the nature of the many beings in relation to this one. 
The One as Manitou
While Deloria suggests that, in this account of the universe, kosmos is personal, 
he makes clear in other places that this personality cannot be understood as constituted by
anthropomorphic qualities. As he states in Spirit and Reason, “To go further and attribute 
a plenitude of familiar human characteristics to the earth is unwarranted. It would cast the
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planet in the restricted clothing of lesser beings, and we would not be able to gain 
insights and knowledge about the real essence of the earth” (Deloria, 1999, 49-50).
Jicarilla Apache philosopher Viola Cordova, essentially concurring with Deloria's 
description in her own account of the Native American ontology, suggests that this 
concept is similar to that of Baruch Spinoza, who presented a radical metaphysical theory
that situated substance as god/nature.  This, she suggests, was a threatening concept for 
European thinkers of his time, as suggested by the excommunication from his Jewish 
religious community and his contradictory labeling as both an atheist and a “God-
intoxicated man.”  In her account, “Spinoza believed that whatever it is of which the 
world is composed can only be one thing. He called this one thing God, Substance, and 
Nature . . . [suggesting] . . . in effect, everything was God . . . [and] . . . this one thing was
material.”  Additionally, Spinoza “saw no problem with calling this matter 'sacred'” 
(Cordova, 2007,110). 
As Spinoza states in The Ethics, “some imagine God in the likeness of man, 
consisting of mind and body, and subject to passions. But it is clear from what has 
already been proved how far they stray from the true knowledge of God” (Spinoza 
EIp15s). God, for Spinoza, was what we can identify as the one, the unified kosmos from 
which flowed the many, the particular entities making up the kosmos.
This monistic view, moreover, Cordova suggests, is comparable to the Jicarilla 
Apache term “Usen”. It is also known as “Manitou” in the Anishnaabe or Ojibwe 
language.  She suggests that, as there are words for this same force in several Indigenous 
languages, it is likely a pan-Indian concept. (Cordova, 2007, 107-108). This aligns with 
Deloria's discussion of what Carl Jung called the mana theory, named after Polynesian 
51
beliefs, that is, “the feeling or belief that the universe is energized by a pervading power.”
He suggests that such an idea is common to tribal people and known in Native American 
tribes as “wakan, orenda, or manitou.” This manitou, as I will refer to it, is a 
fundamentally unified force. This power, Deloria suggests, was recognized religiously 
rather than scientifically, but was fundamental to tribal beliefs. This insight, he suggests, 
was that of a sacred kosmos (Deloria, 2012, 203-204).
It is important to note that though this vitalistic kosmos is living, neither Deloria 
nor Cordova suggest that it can be understood to possess the sort of anthropomorphic 
qualities one might presume such a view to hold.  Deloria suggests the nurturing aspect of
this decidedly nonhuman personality as follows:
The practical criterion that is always cited to demonstrate . . . [the validity of a 
living universe] .  . . is the easily observable fact that the earth nurtures smaller 
forms of life – people, plants, birds, animals, rivers, valleys, and continents. For 
Indians, both speculation and analogy end at this point. To go further and attribute
a plenitude of familiar human characteristics to the earth is unwarranted. It would 
cast the planet in the restricted clothing of lesser beings, and we would not be able
to gain insights and knowledge about the real essence of the earth. (Deloria, 1999,
49-50).
Here we have a picture, I would argue, of a personality with nurturing capacities.  This 
seems in line with the comparison made of this force as mother nature popular with many
environmentalists.  As Cordova states, “the Earth becomes 'mother' when she directs the 
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life force to its numerous creations” (Cordova, 2007, 114).
However, I would suggest that, while we can conceptualize the earth here as 
feminine gendered, via its connection to creative and sustaining powers, this does not 
suggest a leap to a conception of an anthropomorphic mother. Motherhood is a quality 
shared by a diverse arrangement of creatures other than the featherless bipeds who 
exhibit typically anthropocentric and ethnocentric societies. Thus, to isolate a particular 
maternal essence to a human interpretation might be problematic, though we must admit 
that our perceptions of such an entities will be situated from the standpoint of our own 
being.  The earth is mother because we and our sisters and brothers, that is, all the entities
existing on the earth, are dependent upon her and sustained by her. 
It makes sense now to ascertain how similar Deloria's account is to these features 
discussed by Cordova. As we stated above, the earth nurtures smaller forms of life, from 
humans to animals to plants to rivers, valleys, and continents.  While defined as mother, 
according to this characteristic of nurturing, this entity does not possess familiar human 
characteristics.   
The Many in Harmony
This identification of the interconnectedness of the many in a whole is important, 
as it points to a more holistic account of the kosmos and thus, will, in Deloria's view, 
inform a more accurate scientific methodology as well as a more fulfilled general sense 
of being in the world. Such a sense of fulfillment will have positive implications for 
human life generally, but I will discuss this more in the next section on personhood in 
community. For now, I will discuss the nature of the constitutive beings, the many, that 
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make up the unity of being, that is, the one.
 Going back to Deloria's account of this personalistic conception of the universe 
espoused by tribal people, it is important to note how it applies to the many, the multitude
of beings that make up the one which we have identified as manitou, or Gitchi Manitou, 
the “great spirit” or collective manitou in Ojibwe (Bragdon, 2001, 18). Again, 
philosophers may recognize the similarity to Spinoza's god in this respect.  As Spinoza 
suggests, “Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God” 
(Spinoza EIp15). 
Before departing from Spinoza, it is useful to comment on his principle of 
conatus. This idea can be compared to the Delorian account of a certain purposiveness to 
all the entities which make up the one. Spinoza states, “The conatus with which each 
things endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing 
itself” (Spinoza III Pr 7). Importantly, in the preceding proposition, he suggests a 
homeostatic nature to each individuation of the many as he states, “Each thing, in so far 
as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being” (III Pr 6). In Spinozistic thought, a 
particular thing, such as a rock, will behave as a rock, that is, the essence of rock. This 
suggests that entities have a purposive nature, they seek to persist as what they are.  As 
we shall see, this idea is similar to Deloria's account of every entities' responsibility to 
place and purpose.  However, it can be taken in two ways. One in the sense in which 
Deloria defines the purpose of these entities and another in a much more familiarly 
Western way.
One account of Spinoza I see as particularly emblematic of this Western ethos is 
that of Gabriel Albiac writing in the anthology edited by Warren Montag and Ted Stolze.  
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Albiac suggests in “The Empty Synagogue,” discussing what he sees as Spinoza's 
ontological implication of determinism toward conflict, that “Essence is the conatus; and 
the conatus, the effort, is nothing but the conflictual relation of beings with one another 
on this infinite terrain of encounters . . . that is Nature” (Montag, 1997, 137). In this 
conception of the fundamental nature of the many, harsh materialism and conflict is the 
ultimate implication of Spinoza's determinism.
My own opinion is that Albiac gives an excessively negative interpretation of 
Spinoza's concepts that likely maps onto a tendency in Western culture, at least as argued 
by Deloria. As Deloria states, “Instead of the predatory jungle that the Anglo-Saxon 
imagination conjures up to analogize life, in which the most powerful swallows up the 
weak and unprotected, life is better understood as a tapestry or symphony in which each 
player has a specific part or role to play.” Accordingly, respect and community are 
fundamental to identity. Each individual in the many is in relation to the other individuals
of the many. Essentially, every entity might be conceived as a member of a community 
with attendant duties toward all other members (Deloria, 1999, 51).
It is thus important to highlight the moral dimension that is suggested by this 
vitalistic kosmos in Deloria's view.  As he states, “It cannot be argued that the universe is 
moral or has a moral purpose without simultaneously maintaining that the universe is 
alive” (Deloria, 1999, 49).  Useful for defining this important Indigenous concept is 
Cordova's suggestion that our relation to the Earth is that of child to parent (Cordova, 
2007, 116). This relation, she suggests, is very different than the stewardship model 
suggested in a more favorable reading of the anthropomorphic account of humanity's 
place in the kosmos from the Western tradition. For me this point was well communicated
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by environmental philosopher Carolyn Merchant in Radical Ecology, where Merchant 
suggests that, in an ecologically-minded interpretation of the Christian tradition, 
“dominion over the land means that a responsible Christian will care for the land with 
vision, mercy, benevolence, and compassion . . . [because] . . . stewardship means that 
humans have a responsibility to take care of the earth and to insure that all its beings 
function together in an integrated way” (Merchant, 1992, 130). 
This view, environmental philosopher J. Baird Callicott suggests, stems from an 
interpretation of the biblical passage in Genesis 1:26-28 where it is said that God gave 
dominion over the earth and all the other creatures therein to man. This, Callicott 
suggests, allows for three interpretations as follows: the despotic interpretation, the 
stewardship interpretation, and the citizenship interpretation. The first of these is the one 
most criticized, which suggests that the earth is put there for humans to use however they 
see fit. The latter two are more environmentally conscious interpretations, the first of 
which ascribes to what Merchant identifies as well as to what Cordova states the 
Indigenous view is not.  The latter interpretation, which conceives of all entities, 
including humans and non-humans, as equal members of a community or as world 
citizens, is a much more radical interpretation which we need not discuss in this project. I
mention it for fairness' sake with the comment that it is similar to the Indigenous view in 
that it conceives of humans as situated equally with the other creatures (Callicott, 1997, 
14-17). It seems important to note, if we are to follow Deloria's argument, that these 
interpretations are likely not as fundamental to the Christian belief system they have 
developed out of as they are to an Indigenous view. 
Deloria states, “The willingness of entities to allow others to fulfill themselves, 
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and the refusal of any entity to intrude thoughtlessly on another, must be the operative 
principle of this universe” (Deloria, 1999, 50-51). Pratt explains, “The idea of Manitou 
provides a ground for fostering diverse personalities even as it makes understanding and 
unification an ongoing possibility” (Pratt, 2006, 6). In this sense, it accounts for both 
connections between individual entities as well as their diversity. If we recall the tapestry 
or symphony analogy, all the members of the many have their part to play in the one. 
Each individual entity has its particular conatus, to use the Spinoztic term, which, for 
Deloria, is a relation of identity to place. That is, each part of manitou has its role to play 
– its essence to fulfill in the holistic order of a vitalistic kosmos.
As Deloria states, “. . . many medicine men spoke of the places that the various 
entities were destined to occupy, and of the beginning of a world age as time when 
everything was in its proper place” (Deloria, 1999, 54-55). This proper place, he 
suggests, is “manifest in spatial arrangements . . . [which had] . . . three major 
manifestations [. . .] the ceremonial directions; sacred places; particular places” (Deloria, 
1999, 55). The first of these, the ceremonial directions, entail the suggestion that every 
entity and place “was the center of the universe” and necessitated ceremony to reorient 
oneself to the kosmos and allow for the possibility of renewal. The second suggested the 
existence of sacred places as sites of “power and significance,” requiring “respect and 
human self-discipline.” It was at these places that seekers could find revaluation from and
encounter with spiritual forces. Finally, “there was the idea that particular places were 
designed for particular species, and, in human terms, particular people.” This concept 
suggested that there was a proper place assigned to each life-form, thus preserving a 
fundamental balance, that is, a proper relation between each species and their proper 
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place (Deloria, 1999, 55-56).
As Deloria states, “sacred places are the foundation of all other beliefs and 
practices because they represent the presence of the sacred in our lives. They properly 
inform us that we are not larger than nature and that we have responsibilities to the rest of
the natural world that transcend our own personal desires and wishes (Deloria, 2003, 
285).  This relates to the equation we discussed earlier, that is, that power and place equal
personality.   Accordingly, “Deloria's notion of persons is best understood as a form of 
vitalism in that persons are characterized by their purposes relative to their places.” 
(Pratt, 2006, 5).
We have discussed the nature of the one and the many in Deloria's ontology of a 
vitalistic kosmos constituted by agents in relation to one another. Particularly important 
for the following discussion of epistemology, and ultimately, scientific methodology, is 
the notion that a living universe carries with it significant moral implications. Conceived 
of as a tapestry or symphony in which each individual entity is given a proper role to 
play, the vitalistic kosmos is fundamentally different than the understanding often 
employed in the Western tradition of nature as agonistic and defined by conflict relations.
The conatus of a Delorian entity is not merely one which suggests a preservation of 
essence from an individualistic perspective, but is rather one which connects essence to 
place. When a pebble person pebbles, it doesn't pebble as an isolated pebble rather, it 
pebbles as a pebble in a kosmos in which it has the specific role of pebbling. Similarly, 
human persons have a role to play and, as humans, we too are defined by fundamentally 
human activities.
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Personhood in Community
 Cordova suggests that “being human, in the Native American perspective, 
requires having an 'enlarged sense of self' . . . [that is, one that] . . . does not suffer a 
dilution or eradication as is so feared in the Western view of individuality, but, instead, an
'enlargement' of the sense of what one is” (Cordova, 2007, 149-150). In other words, 
being human, for a Native American, is not to be a person separate from the very living 
world which one is a part of.  This, of course, connects to the concept of the world as a 
living universe.  All the entities that populate the world are persons just as humans are 
merely some examples of persons. 
To be a person is to be in relation to place, that is, as part of a living universe in 
which one exists in a kinship relation to all other parts, that is, all other persons.   This 
entails a fundamental sense of purpose and moral responsibility as one understands that 
“humans beings are not above nature or the result of the world . . . [but are rather] . . . 
incomplete without the rest of the world . . . [in which] . . . every species needs to give to 
every other species in order to make up a universe” (Deloria, 1999, 226). 
Correspondence, Community and Circular Knowledge
I want to suggest from the preceding discussion of the One and the Many in the 
Native view that Deloria's suggestion is that tribal peoples hold to an agent ontology that 
allows for a kind of indigenous pragmatic realism that is more about acceptance of 
knowledge from a living universe than forcing of knowledge from an inert, passive, 
lifeless universe as it is in the epistemology of Western science. The way this knowledge 
is organized, thus, is not that of universal-realism and does not feature the same divisions 
59
and bifurcations seen in the Western method.  We might even go so far as to say that 
many of the doctrines of Western logic, such as the law of the excluded middle or the 
principle of noncontradiction do not follow for Native epistemology as defined by its 
vitalistic, relational agent ontology. This is suggested as Deloria states, 
In the Indian conception, it was impossible that there could be abstract 
propositions that could be used to explore the structure of the physical world. 
Knowledge was derived from individual and communal experiences in daily life, 
in keen observation of the environment, and in interpretive messages that they 
received from spirits in ceremonies, visions, and dreams. (Deloria, 1999, 44)
Similar to Deloria's view, Shawnee philosopher Thomas Norton-Smith offers a view of 
Native philosophy that I think helps to clarify Deloria's position. Indigenous 
epistemology is rendered according to what Norton-Smith terms “relatedness as a world-
ordering principle” such that “all beings and their actions in the American Indian world 
are related and interconnected, so knowing about the world involves actively seeking out 
newly emerging connections between experiences” (Norton-Smith, 2010, 58). This act of 
seeking out knowledge of emerging connections, however, is not one of violent 
acquisition and dominance.  There is no impartial observer with a view from nowhere in 
Indigenous thought, that is, “there is no innocent observation of the world without 
consequence.”  Rather, since, echoing Deloria's statement that we are all related, 
“everything is related and we are all relatives, so all entities and beings are 
interconnected, valuable by virtue of those interconnections, and due respect.” 
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Indigenous knowledge is, thus, “principally a procedural knowledge” involving “activity, 
performance, or procedure, perhaps as elaborate as storytelling, a healing, or a ritual 
ceremony, or a simple as observing the world to learn something from it” (Norton-Smith, 
2010, 58-59).  This is, of course, not to say that Western science lacks a component of 
procedural knowledge, but rather, to stress that Indigenous procedural knowledge entails 
a fundamental respect for one's relations.  
Outlining a story of Black Elk's account of how the Sioux came their central 
religious object, the White Buffalo Calf Pipe, through a woman who gave moral and 
religious instruction to the people,  Deloria suggests that “the Western Sioux obtained 
their knowledge by accepting everything they experienced as grist for the mill,” even 
mystical experience, thus preserving experiences and ideas that Western science rejects 
(Deloria, 1999, 44). In this epistemology, for example, emotional experiences and 
insights from sources outside the standards of Western methodology are given credence.  
Such sources of knowledge might seem very surprising to the Western mind, as Deloria 
suggests “specific instructions were given to the old people regarding plants, animals, 
birds and reptiles, stones, and technology on how to live in community with them . . . 
[and] . . . these instructions came in dreams, visions, and unusual incidents, and more 
often than not the relationship with plants and animals was a result of interspecies 
communication” (Deloria, 1999, 131).  In this sense, non-human animals and the like 
were situated as non-human persons that humans were to learn from, rather than enslave 
and control.
Moreover, in an ever changing universe defined as a vitalistic kosmos, in which 
all entities are respected and privileged to act as agents, Deloria suggests that “we must 
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be alert and try not to classify things too quickly . . . [as] . . . the world is constantly 
creating itself . . . and making choices that determine the future” (Deloria, 1999, 46). 
Thus, we see a skepticism concerning absolute trust in induction, accepted as 
fundamental to reality. In a non-mechanistic conception of the world, a world of 
expanded possibilities is opened and must be dealt with flexibility.  Thus, the method 
Deloria suggests as employed by tribal peoples is that of correspondence. As he states,
Many tribes described relationships in terms of correspondence between two 
things ordinarily thought to be distinct, isolated, or unrelated. The old saying in 
religious ceremonies – as above so it is on earth – is such a correspondence; so is 
the gathering of things for medicine bags, for making drums, weapons, household 
goods, and clothing, and creating altars and blessing dwellings. In each of these 
activities a variety of things are used and they are said to 'represent' certain things.
'Represent' here is not taken as a symbolic gesture but usually means that these 
things, their power and knowledge, are actually present in the creation of 
something new. (Deloria, 1999, 132)
Deloria offers as an example of this the way Osages planted corn. They would plant the 
corn in the spring around the Missouri River before traveling to the Rockies for summer 
hunting.  They would know it was time to return when the leaves changed color in the fall
and their crops were ready. Deloria suggests that this sort of knowledge typified the 
Indigenous epistemology (Deloria, 1999, 133).
With attention to personality as an important constituent of the kosmos, Native 
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Americans, in Deloria's view, sought to understand psychological behavior of all entities 
such that they” began to observe and remember how and when things happened together .
. . [such] . . . that they made connections between things that had no sequential 
relationships.” Even with “no firm belief in cause and effect, which plays such an 
important role in Western science and thinking . . . Indians were . . . [still ] . . . well aware
that when a certain sequence of things began, certain other elements or events would also 
occur.”  (Deloria, 2001, 26).
We see here, then, a certain methodology at work in which seemingly unrelated 
activities and ceremonies actually result in the accomplishment of certain tasks of 
necessary for survival. Essentially, without a strict method of division and exclusion, the 
same basic goals common to all peoples, Western or non-Western, are eventually reached 
through knowledges and practices passed down through generations as received through 
a variety of methods and sources.
Knowledge, in this format, Deloria suggests, was arranged circularly with “no 
ultimate terms or constituents of their universe, only sets of relationships that sought to 
describe phenomena . . . [such that] . . . no concept could stand alone in the way that time,
space, and matter once stood as absolute entities in Western science.” In this scheme, 
knowledge was attained, as one idea served as a starting point and was examined by its 
relations with other concepts. Thus, one would “arrive back at the starting point with the 
assurance that a person could properly interpret what constituted the idea and how it 
might manifest itself in concrete physical experiences” (Deloria, 1999, 48). 
In addition to this method devoid of the classic logical principles of Western 
science, there “was a wholistic understanding that undergirded tribal technology . . . [such
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that] . . . the knowledge that the old ones attached to their technology demanded that they 
use their powers sparingly and on the proper occasion. (Deloria, 1999, 133). In this sense,
there was a principle of limitation at work in Indigenous knowledge practice.
How one gets knowledge is very important to the Native view. That there are 
moral implications to every action taken, even that of attaining knowledge, is suggested 
by Deloria: “the Indian people were concerned about the products of what they did, and 
they sought to anticipate and consider all possible effects of their actions.” (Deloria, 
2001, 23).
In that knowledge was fundamentally a relational affair, as everything in the 
conception of the kosmos as vitalistic, “Indian people carefully observed phenomena in 
order to determine what relations existed between and among the various 'peoples' of the 
world . . . [such that] . . . Indians . . . [had the knowledge to] . . . live comfortably in the 
physical world, and to not unduly intrude into the lives of other creatures” (Deloria, 1999,
53). 
 Thus, for the Native American, attainment of knowledge is a relation of respect 
and reciprocity such that some knowledge may be off-limits.  As professor of Native 
American Studies, Andrea Smith quotes Cree historian Winona Wheeler, “In the Cree 
world all knowledge is not knowable because knowledge is property in the sense that it is
owned and can only be transmitted by the legitimate owner” (Smith 133). As Deloria 
states, “A great gulf exists between these two ways of handling knowledge . . . [as] . . . 
science forces secrets from nature by experimentation . . . [while] . . . the traditional 
people accepted secrets from the rest of creation” (Deloria, 1999, 135).
This form of knowledge, Deloria suggests, is holistic and, being predicated upon 
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relationality and the perceived correspondences between entities and concepts, however 
seemingly unrelated from a less discerning eye, allows for an increased perception of 
anomalies.  With fundamental attention to harmony and “natural ordering of comic 
energies,” the people could respond to perceived imbalance and seek to correct that 
imbalance through the use of ceremonies. Rather than reducing phenomena to “alleged 
constitutive parts and inherent principles,” the tribal epistemology works with the whole 
vision in mind (Deloria, 1999, 134-135).
As Deloria suggests, “Instead of isolating things, Indians encompassed them; 
togetherness, synthesis, and relatedness characterized their experience of the universe.”  
In turn, this led to “a knowledge totally unlike Western scientific knowledge and yet an 
understanding of great profundity . . . such that . . . [tribal peoples] . . . have an intuitive 
understanding of the spiritual nature of life which enables people to act in a purposive 
and predictive sense” (Deloria, 1978, 13).  This form of knowing, following Deloria's 
argument, is one more fundamentally suited to a sustainable and satisfactory existence in 
relation to the non-human and various human worlds.  It is adaptive and 
epistemologically open, in contrast to the Western epistemic attitude we have been 
critiquing. This alternative metaphysics avoids the epistemic attitude of exclusion that we
discuss Deloria critiques. Additionally, this model of epistemology, fashioned around a 
fundamentally interconnected agent-ontology, cannot be understood according to the 
usual subject-object scheme. We will return to this latter point in chapter five.
Conclusion
 With contrast to the Western perspective as outlined in the first chapter, it isn't 
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clear how the universal-realist tradition with its exceptionalist-triumphalist narratives can 
see the range of possibilities afforded by the Indigenous tradition. The fourth chapter has 
given us some hope in terms of Western science's ability to reform itself via the adoption 
of differing paradigms. These, however, are aptly described as revolutions. The effort 
associated with making change presents itself as a problematic stumbling block. 
Additionally, it seems as though a voice from the bastions of the academy might 
be necessary. This is perhaps why it is useful to compare Indigenous thought to Western 
thought and notice similarities on the margins as we have done.  Our next step will be to 
develop the idea that we might suggest that Deloria ultimately proposes – a necessary 
move beyond Feyerabend and epistemological anarchy.
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CHAPTER V
AGAINST ANARCHY
Having outlined a description of two competing metaphysics of the Western and 
Indigenous traditions, and their entailing epistemic attitudes, we are able to better 
appreciate Deloria's project as one of reforming a problematic universal-realist and 
exceptionalist-triumphalist orientation toward knowledge-practice and knowledge-
valuation. Put in simpler terms, Deloria's project is one of reforming a certain epistemic 
attitude of exclusion seen in customary practice of Western science.  Along these lines, 
we have suggested that Deloria seeks to extend the rubric of acceptable science to the 
knowledge-production of indigenous folk, in that indigenous folk have a wealth of 
knowledge specific to place and relationality. This, in the thought of several indigenous 
thinkers, including Deloria, has implications for both Indigenous sovereignty and for the 
survival of humanity in general.
To return to Paul Feyerabend's epistemological anarchy, we find his views to 
coincide with Deloria as they share an expanded concept of acceptable knowledge. 
However, Feyerabend differs from Kuhn, in Deloria's account, due to his willingness to 
consider voices outside the institution of science as able to advance what is later termed 
scientific progress. Indeed, Deloria suggests, science does proceed in fits and starts, as in 
Kuhn's account of paradigms, and results from the knowledge production of those outside
the acceptable paradigm of normal science. These outliers, if they succeed in upsetting 
the establishment, eventually prompt paradigm shifts. However, Deloria maintains, this 
account remains limited as Kuhn fails to account for viable knowledge production outside
of the established institutions of scientific practice. Kuhn's account, he suggests, still 
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bows to the established institutional authority and is, thus, limited.
In Deloria's opinion, however, Feyerabend is willing to lend credence to 
mythological and religious accounts in a way that Kuhn's account is unwilling to. 
Deloria, in Spirit and Reason, states that Feyerabend holds that “ideas should be judged 
by their potential for making a contribution to understanding, not on their origin, former 
use, or relationships to accepted symbols of contemporary authority” (Deloria, 1999, 8).
This point about Feyerabend's epistemic openness is corroborated with reference 
to Feyerabend's book, Against Method, wherein Feyerabend goes so far as to suggest that 
anything is open for consideration in terms of scientific methodology. In Feyerabend's 
thought, excessive adherence to categories contingent upon particular paradigms impacts 
actual knowledge-practice, often such that practice is stunted. The idea of a particular 
unchanging methodology or strict adherence to certain accounts of rationality can be 
limiting. As he states, “The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything 
goes” (Feyerabend, 1988, 14). 
Feyerabend's primary concern is not the wielding of greater power via acquisition 
to dominate nature, as in the epistemic view Deloria critiques. As Feyerabend states in his
autobiography, Killing Time, the pursuit of knowledge is better informed by shirking 
adherence to “abstract concepts such as 'truth,' 'reality,' or 'objectivity' . . . [as these 
concepts] . . . narrow people's vision and ways of being in the world” (Feyerabend, 1996, 
179-80).
Deloria, as we have suggested, wants to facilitate a similar integrated system of 
knowledge-production that includes tribal wisdom from traditional sources. The problem 
with Western science, in Deloria's account, is its tendency toward vicious abstraction and 
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misplaced concreteness. These fallacies lead to the very attitude of exceptionalist-
triumphalism that precludes the respect Deloria believes Indigenous knowers are entitled 
to.
However, Deloria, we might suggest, moves beyond an account of science as 
simply anarchistic. His admonition to Western science can be understood as not unlike 
that of Gregory Cajete. As Cajete states, “Western science must acknowledge . . . [a 
common foundation rooted] . . . in the same physical world as Native science, and for its 
continued evolution, it must integrate and apply the collective lived experience of human 
participation with nature” (Cajete, 2000, 25).
This viewpoint is an embodied one, as “modern thinking abstracts the mind from 
the human body and the body of the world. This modern orientation, in turn, frequently 
disconnected Western science from the lived and experienced world of nature” (Cajete, 
2000, 26). This matches well with our account of Deloria's suggestion that Western 
science is aligned with a particularly maladaptive epistemic attitude of vicious abstraction
and exclusion.  This abstraction is fundamental to the universal-realist view we described,
but particularly its universal component. The ontological fear underlying the universal-
realist view leads to the exceptionalist-triumphalist narrative, wherein Western culture 
takes on a combative role with the rest of existence.  Merged with an anthropomorphic 
myth derived from Genesis, Deloria suggests, the Greek tendency to highlight abstract 
and universal categories over the assumed illusory nature of experience led on one hand 
to a condition of fundamental alienation, including from nature and from one another, and
on the other hand, a position of planetary dominance for Western culture.  The 
exceptionalist-triumphalist narrative is simply part of this dominance. Devaluation of 
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other cultures obscures the tremendous sins of the fathers of contemporary Western 
science and culture, while also serving to heighten the esteem afforded to Western 
culture. Put poetically, Apollo can stand, holding forth the severed head of the Gorgon, 
chasing back the Dionysian masses, and have a clear conscience about the whole affair.3 
History of genocide be damned if those other cultures aren't important, we got science 
and culture in the end!
Intellectual Sovereignty and Unified Metaphysics
We see the exceptionalist-triumphalist narrative playing out in perhaps its most 
harrowing manifestation as the genocidal acquisition of this content unfolds with the 
culpable culture most fantastically deluding themselves into a sense of doing the right 
thing.  As Deloria states,
A century ago whites trampled Indian legal rights, religion, and culture because 
they considered it a primitive and savage form of human existence that no group 
of people should be forced to maintain. The motivation of injustices past was the 
strongly held belief of non-Indians that they were given the divine command to 
civilize the peoples of the earth. In short, they did it because they thought they 
were right. (Deloria, 1999, 202-203)
3  The distinction found in Frederick Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy between the Dionysian and 
Apollonian elements, that is the chaotic, emotional element of Dionysus and the element of orderly mastery
over nature represented by the figure of Apollo provide useful metaphors here (Nietzsche, 1967, 39). In 
some sense, the way in which Dionysus operates as Apollo's other provides a good metaphor for the way in 
which the non-Western world is fixed as Western modernity's other or, as we might more radically put it, 
savagery and barbarism as civilization's other. As Harding suggests, modernity necessarily establishes 
tradition as an other, so as to make itself more attractive (Hardin, 2008, 179).
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The exceptionalist-triumphalist narrative at work in these phenomena was and is 
harmful in more ways than just how it decimated the indigenous peoples. On one hand, it 
is most clearly detrimental to the peoples oppressed by the dark history of colonialism. 
From Stannard's account of genocide to Deloria's struggle for his people to be afforded 
respect as knowers, we have proposed that such a narrative has had and continues to have
a detrimental effect on Native peoples. What is perhaps less obvious is the manner in 
which such a disjointed existence in the world, via the universal-realist lens and the sort 
of epistemic conservatism and authoritarianism that Feyerabend rejects, affects the lived 
experience of the colonizer as well as the planetary context. In this scheme of existence, 
the environment is conceptually divided as nature in opposition to human culture. 
Deloria argues that the idea of alienation and feeling displaced, discussed and 
theorized about by everyone from Marxists to Christians to existentialists, is a product of 
the metaphysical underpinnings of Western culture – Western science and Western 
religion included. Deloria, while concerned with Indigenous sovereignty, is also 
concerned with worldwide existence and has a clear idea of what this would involve. The 
prescription of indigenization has clear implications for both.
It is important, as an aid in understanding, to contrast between sovereignty in an 
absolute separatist sense and sovereignty in a way attendant to the necessary relation of 
Indigenous culture toward Western culture as a result of shared existence in the same 
planetary setting. Recalling the importance of community and interrelation in Deloria's 
account, we must conclude that Deloria is concerned with sovereignty in the sense that 
recognizes interrelatedness with settler culture. Accordingly, Deloria's account has both a 
component of concern for Indigenous sovereignty as well as a remedy for humanity's 
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fractured planetary existence.
To comment first on the issue of Native sovereignty, as Warrior states, “By the 
time he wrote God is Red, Deloria believed that the key to an American Indian future was
the return to Native ceremonies and traditions within a framework of asserting 
sovereignty” (Warrior, 1995, 88). This indigenization, however, isn't isolated to the 
revitalization of Indigenous cultures in isolation. There is a way of existing in harmony 
with the rest of existence that Deloria maintains Native American tradition emphasizes.  
Warrior suggests that, more than striving for Indigenous sovereignty, Deloria holds that 
the traditional Native American way of life is the most suited as the ideal form of human 
existence. As Warrior states,
What Deloria articulates . . . is a position that does not simply posit the essential
superiority of American Indians traditions over other ways of life and cultures. 
His argument that American Indian traditions are the best way of living arises 
from the presence of those traditions in this particular place for such a long period
of time and from the actual practices derived from them. (Warrior, 1995, 91)
This point was argued in chapter five where Deloria describes what I identified as a 
vitalistic kosmos made up of a variety of purposive agents in community.  This 
Spinozistic-esque understanding of the kosmos can be understood as providing a 
particular ethical system and epistemology. If all that exists is living and interrelatedness 
is fundamental to existence, then every being has an interrelational responsibility toward 
all other beings, as all have a specific role respective to their place. Thus, knowledge 
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itself must be considered an interrelated phenomena and knowledge production an 
exchange between equals rather than a hierarchy of subject to object. This involves a 
certain art of listening to the whole rather than merely employing the reductive violence 
of reason against the rest of the kosmos.
Following this brief discussion of Deloria's suggestion that the Indigenous 
epistemology and way of living is most beneficial for all humanity, we will now explore 
Daniel Wildcat's presentation of Indigenous realism as a solution to many contemporary 
problems we face today, in particular the impending threat of climate change.
Indigenization as a Solution
As we have discussed, Deloria finds that Indigenous knowledge is particularly 
adaptive and offers a well-rooted alternative of living in balance to the paradigm of 
domination that underlies Western culture. Wildcat concurs with this idea, stating that 
“Indigenous knowledges offer insights into living well on Mother Earth because they are 
fundamentally cooperative and collaborative constructions” (Wildcat, 2009, 77). In this 
light, this project of examining Native philosophy seems vitally important, echoing 
Wildcat's view that “. . . the proposal to critically examine the knowledge and wisdom of 
the indigenous peoples of North America for insights on how humans might live well and
enhance life on the planet seems prudent” (Wildcat, 2009, 79). Furthermore, “the 
proposal to use indigenous knowledges to save the Earth denotes knowledge as 
something not passively found in 'nature,' but something found in the experiential 
exploration of our human place within the natural world” (Wildcat, 2009, 73).
This conclusion maps well onto Dewey's suggestion, as Wildcat paraphrases him, 
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that there are “miseducative features of the Western dualism, or . . . [an] . . . invidious 
distinction between nature and culture.” Against this invidious distinction, which we have
traced through Deloria's historical account of Western epistemology and ontology, 
Deloria as well as Dewey offer the insight “that understanding is more important than 
knowledge as truth, or knowledge as certainty” (Wildcat, 2009, 104-105).
The ways in which epistemology works under such a scheme of knowledge as 
certainty or truth results in the overlooking of experiential “knowledge gained through 
attentive living, such as singing and drumming.” While “experimental logic and analysis”
is important, it is “in and of itself, insufficient in generating life-enhancing knowledges 
for humankind. Rather, “the necessary and sufficient conditions for life-enhancing 
knowledge requires paying attention to the life surrounding us.” Wildcat calls the 
outcome of this remedied orientation a “deep spatial experiential body of knowledge 
compiled by scientific information and knowledge” (Wildcat, 2009, 15).
Relatedly, both Deloria and Wildcat can be read as advocating a rejection of the 
tentative outcomes of either-or distinctions as exclusionary definitions of universal, 
absolute knowledge. With the realization of the truly subjective dimension attached to so-
called neutral point-zero observers, all observations must be treated as tentative and 
embodied, dependent on the situatedness of all epistemic claims. Moreover, situatedness 
as an epistemic agent is also situatedness in place, as Deloria and Wildcat would argue. In
this sense, the individual is not an atomistic entity, but is rather fundamentally in 
community both with fellow human beings as well as the Delorian vitalistic kosmos 
composed of a multitude of agents, as we have outlined.
As Wildcat suggests, “many indigenous knowledge systems extend the notion of 
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knowledge-construction to a cooperative activity involving the other-than-human life that
surrounds us” (Wildcat, 2009, 17). Attendant to this concept, there is a sort of pan-Indian 
“recognition of practical knowledge and . . .  goals . . . [as] . . . based on . . . 
acknowledgement and respect – an attentiveness – to the sacred in the world surrounding 
us” (Wildcat, 2009, 56). This perspective, Wildcat suggests, is vitally important to our 
survival, which we have already suggested is Deloria's motivation.  As Wildcat states, 
“Now we face a situation on the planet where Native voices must be heard in order to 
avert or hopefully minimize the deadly events emerging” (Wildcat, 2009, 61).
As we have demonstrated in chapter five, Deloria holds that Indigenous 
epistemology and ontology is particularly suited to planetary adaptiveness and survival.  
Wildcat echoes this claim, stating “because indigenous people have paid attention to our 
Mother Earth, it is important to listen to what we can share with humankind” (Wildcat, 
2009, 17).
In Wildcat's view, “we can, if attentive, live in what the American Pragmatist John
Dewey suggested was a coextensive present with both the past and the future” (Wildcat, 
2009, 114-115).  This means that rather than picturing a teleological progression from a 
primitive state to a more advanced state, with attendant morally evaluative statements, we
can modify our modernist ways of being more closely to that of an Indigenous way of 
being. 
There is, again, a way of being in the world that is not informed by the 
anthropocentric admonition to be fruitful, multiply and subdue the earth. This alternative 
is to live in accordance with one's biological community and the natural limitations of the
world. This, Wildcat and Deloria argue, is a fundamental strength of the indigenous 
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viewpoint.
Conclusion
In this account we have examined Deloria's critique of Western science and 
suggested that this is better conceived of as a critique of its particular epistemic attitude.  
Deloria focuses on the exclusionary work that it does, promoting what we have termed an
exceptionalist-triumphalist narrative. This is as a result of universal-realism. The 
adherence to universal categories, as derived from Greek philosophy, leads necessarily to 
many bifurcations, a problematic relation to the environment, and a tendency toward 
authoritarianism. An adherence to such a closed account of possible knowledge, as 
Feyerabend argued, precludes a more effective practice of science – a view that Deloria 
echoes quite strongly.
Deloria, however, moves beyond Feyerabend in his account of what we might 
term indigenous realism, following Wildcat's calls to find a solution to our present 
environmental predicament. Accordingly, Deloria provides an account of knowledge 
based upon acceptance of vitalistic kosmos that both affirms the knowledge-production of
indigenous folk and also provides a solution to the contemporary issues through a focus 
on localization of epistemology and human existence. Knowledge, in the indigenous 
perspective, becomes more than a subject-object relation and the forcible acquisition of 
data.  
Humans, with a proper sense of place and duty to community, including non-
human members, practice knowledge-production in a very different context than 
contemporary Western society. Knowledge-practice becomes a two-way street – a way in 
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which the knower affirms the agency of the non-human world while at the same time 
accepts the wisdom imparted by non-human world. Knowledge-practice is thus limited 
by place and context and does not adhere to Feyerabend's suggestion that “anything 
goes.” Knowledge, as all things, has a particular place.
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